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Delegation in Immigration Law
Adam B. Coxt & EricA. Posnertt
Immigration law both screens migrantsand regulatesthe behavior of migrants after
they have arrived.Both activities are information intensive because the migrant's "type"
and the migrant'spost-arrivalactivity are often forms of private information that are not
immediately accessible to government agents. To overcome this informationproblem, the
nationalgovernment can delegate the screening and regulatingfunctions. American immigration law, for example, delegates extensive authority to both private entitiesparadigmatically,employers andfamilies-and to the fifty states. From the government's
perspective, delegation carries with it benefits and costs. On the benefit side, agents frequently have easy access to information about the types and activities of migrants and can
cheaply monitor and control them. On the cost side, agents' preferences are not always
aligned with those of the nationalgovernment. The national government can ameliorate
these costs by giving agents incentives to act consistently with the government's interests.
Understandingthese virtues and vices of delegation sheds light on longstanding debates
about the roles that employers, families, and statesplay in American immigrationlaw.
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INTRODUCTION

American immigration law is widely understood to consolidate
power in the political branches of the national government. The field's
central jurisprudential feature-the doctrine of immigration "plenary
power" -is taken to stand for the proposition that the federal government has nearly unfettered authority to decide which migrants to admit
into and deport from the United States.' This authority is embodied in
the Immigration and Nationality Act' (INA), a prolix code that appears
to describe in painstakingly intricate detail the rules that govern the
screening and conduct of immigrants. And this power is jealously
guarded by the federal government: when Arizona recently enacted its
own immigration-related legislation, the United States took the nearly

1 See, for example, Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 609 (1889) (explaining
that the power to exclude foreigners belongs to the federal government as a result of the constitution's delegation of sovereignty). See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and
the Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 S Ct Rev 255, 255 ("In an undeviating line
of cases spanning almost one hundred years, the Court has declared itself powerless to review
even those immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as race, gender, and legitimacy."); Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting.: The Origins of
Plenary Power, in David A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck, eds, Immigration Stories 7, 7 (Foundation 2005).
2 Pub L No 82-414, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
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unprecedented step of suing the state, arguing that Arizona's statute
could not stand because the national government holds exclusive authority over the admission of immigrants.' Given these features, it is
unsurprising that American immigration law is seldom thought to involve significant delegation, to actors outside the federal government,
of the core power to decide who gets to live in the United States. In
fact, some scholars have argued that the nature of the immigration plenary power is such that the federal government may be constitutionally
prohibited from delegating its authority to other actors.
Despite this conventional wisdom, this Article demonstrates
that delegation is pervasive in American immigration law. The federal government rarely makes decisions on its own about which immigrants should be admitted. Instead, it delegates to agents outside
the federal government tremendous power to select the "types" of
migrants who are admitted-to make admissions decisions based on
the nature of their labor-market skills, the level of their language
proficiency, their likelihood of success in the United States, and so
forth.' Even more surprisingly, it also delegates significant power to
these agents to control migrants once they arrive in the country and
to decide whether they should be deported.'
In theory these immigration decisions could be given over to any
of a vast number of possible agents, ranging from individual citizens,
to private organizations like universities and religious organizations,
to international entities or perhaps even other nations. And while
many different agents do play some role in American immigration
law, two prominent private agents stand out-employers and families. Employers are given wide powers to choose which foreign
workers will be awarded coveted labor-migration visas. They often
also have the power to remove those workers from the country.
3
See Complaint, United States v Arizona, No 10-01413, *8-9 (D Ariz filed July 6, 2010)
(available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 2653363) ("Congress [] holds exclusive authority for establishing alien status categories and setting the conditions of aliens' entry and continued presence."). The federal government's position was vindicated by the Supreme Court, which struck
down core provisions of the Arizona statute. See Arizona v United States, 132 S Ct 2492 (2012).
4
See, for example, Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection,and Federalism,76 NYU L Rev 493, 532-49 (2001).
5
In most cases, the federal government does set the overall numerical limits on migration, even as it delegates significant power to pick among different prospective migrants. In
some cases, however, the agents are empowered to select migrants who are exempt from the
quota system-and in this way alter the overall number of migrants admitted. See 8 USC
§ 1153(a). See also text accompanying notes 103-06.
6
Even within the federal government there are large-scale delegations to the president
that have often been overlooked by immigration scholars. For an extended discussion of the
importance of this delegation, see Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The Presidentand
Immigration Law, 119 Yale L J 458, 460-61 (2009).
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Similarly, the federal government delegates to family members the
power to select immigrants by filing petitions on behalf of their foreign-born spouses, children, and other relatives-who, without the
sponsoring family member's petition, could never legally migrate to
the United States.
Moreover, in addition to these private agents the federal government often delegates significant screening and regulatory authority
over immigrants to states and local governments. This basic fact has
been overlooked in the controversy surrounding Arizona v United
States,' in which the US government challenged an Arizona law criminalizing certain US immigration law violations.! Many commentators
argued that Arizona violated basic federalism principles by engaging
in migration-related enforcement activity that lies outside the authority of the states. But while the United States was suing Arizona on that
very theory, it was simultaneously rolling out new regulatory initiatives that delegated significant immigration enforcement authority to
local law enforcement officials in Arizona.
The American approach is radically different from that used by
most other countries. Rather than use a bottom-up, decentralized
approach to admit immigrants, many nations employ a top-down approach in which the government determines the number and type of
people who will be admitted each year either as temporary workers
or permanent migrants. In Canada, for example, the government uses a merit-based points system, which assigns higher points to migrants with strong credentials, useful experience, language ability,
and related characteristics." Approaches like Canada's are superficially quite appealing: They seem to rationalize the screening process
and provide a straightforward metric for distinguishing between the
types of migrants a state values and those it does not. Their appeal
even led US lawmakers during the last attempt at comprehensive
immigration reform to propose amendments that would have

132 S Ct 2492 (2012).
Id at 2497-98.
9 See, for example, James Doty, Arizona's New Immigration Law is Unconstitutional
(Salon Apr 26, 2010), online at http://www.salon.com/2010/04/26/is-arizonaimmigration-law
-constitutional (visited Nov 25, 2012). See also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratoriesof Immigration Reform, 62 Hastings L J 1673, 1675-79 (2011).
10 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Other Selection Factors-Skilled
Workers and Professionals (June 26, 2010), online at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/
skilled/apply-factors.asp (visited Nov 25, 2012) (explaining the criteria for assigning points, of
which an immigrant must get 67 out of 100 in order to qualify for immigration). See also Part
II.E.1 (discussing points systems for labor migration).
7
8
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scrapped much of the United States's existing system and replaced it
with a more top-down approach like Canada's."
Despite the seeming rationality of such an approach, this Article
argues that delegating to agents (partial) authority to admit foreign
migrants enables the government to exploit the informational advantages of those agents. As principal-agent theory suggests, individuals and institutions can obtain significant gains by delegating authority to agents in a range of circumstances. In the case of the
immigration system, the US government can obtain better migration
outcomes-admitting more socially valuable migrants while excluding less socially valuable migrants-by delegating decision making to
agents. Employers can often do a far superior job of evaluating the
productivity of foreign workers. Family members are generally in a
better position than the government to evaluate the capability of potential migrants to integrate after arrival. And states have more information about local immigration conditions-and vastly more information about where individual immigrants are located-than does
the federal government.
But delegation comes with costs: agents can ignore the principal's interests and pursue their own agendas, or they can simply
shirk. As principal-agent theory shows, principals can construct contracts or rules that provide agents with better incentives. We argue
that American immigration law supplies some such rules. The delegation to private agents and to state and local governments is partial.
In many cases, the restrictions imposed on the agents' decisionmaking powers can be seen as efforts to align the agents' incentives
with those of the federal government, or at least to blunt shirking
when those interests inevitably come into conflict. Employers cannot
admit workers who will inflict certain negative impacts on the US labor market. Family members are by definition limited to picking
from a very small pool of prospective migrants-except in the case of
marriage, where complex rules discourage the agents from selling
their spousal sponsorship to the highest bidder. And state and local
governmental actors face a monitoring scheme designed to curb both
under- and overzealous screening behavior by those actors.
Principal-agent models can therefore help us better understand and
evaluate the structure of American immigration law. In what follows,

11 Compare SA 1358 to S 1348, 110th Cong, 1st Sess, in 153 Cong Rec S 7204-05 (daily
ed June 6, 2007) (proposing a points system based on factors such as occupation, arranged employment, age, and English language ability), with CIC, Coming to Canada as a Business Immigrant (Dec 7, 2010), online at http://cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/busimm.asp (visited Nov 25, 2012).
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we show how the theory provides an important defense of some oftcriticized features of the US system. However, we do not argue that
the US system is the best possible. We identify a number of features
that are perverse from a principal-agent perspective, suggesting
grounds on which those features should be reformed. Moreover, the
introduction of a new way of thinking about immigration delegation
raises larger questions that are beyond this Article's scope of inquiry-such as questions about what other potential agents an institutional designer might employ were she structuring the immigration
system from scratch.
This Article builds on two earlier articles we have written about
the second-order structure of immigration law-the legal rules that
are designed to promote certain first-order migration goals.'2 While
we are interested principally in these second-order questions, as in
our earlier work we must make some assumptions about first-order
goals in order to motivate the analysis. Throughout the Article we
draw these assumptions about first-order goals from the structure of
immigration law itself; they include broad assumptions that the government would like to control the flow of both the numbers and
types of immigrants, as well as more specific assumptions-for example, that the government would like to increase the pool of human
capital available to US employers, or perhaps even promote a certain
racial, ethnic, or cultural mix among immigrants. As in our earlier
work, our central interest is not the defensibility of the particular
goals we discuss. It is, instead, the relationship between these goals
and the use of delegation as a second-order design strategy in immigration law.
Part I of this Article sets out the theoretical framework. Parts II,
III, and IV apply the framework to employers, families, and the
states.
I. PRINCIPALS, AGENTS, AND DELEGATION
Delegation refers to the transfer of authority from one party to
another with the expectation that the delegate (or "agent") will use
that authority to achieve the goals of the other party (the "principal").
Such agency relationships are ubiquitous. Employers delegate power
to employees; governments delegate power to agencies; firms delegate
power to outside contractors. The essence of the agency relationship is
12 See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract
Framework,84 NYU L Rev 1403, 1409 (2009); Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The SecondOrder Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan L Rev 809, 811-12 (2007).
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the superior information of the agent: the principal delegates to the
agent in order to take advantage of the agent's expertise, but because
the agent has better information than the principal, the principal will
have difficulty monitoring the agent and ensuring that the agent acts in
the principal's interest. Economists and political scientists use principal-agent models to analyze these relationships."
In a principal-agent model, the principal hires an agent to perform a task that benefits the principal. The agent's preferences and
the principal's preferences are not the same. In some models, the
agent chooses between a high level of effort and a low level of effort
("shirking"). The agent prefers to engage in the low level of effort
because it is less work, but the principal gains more from the high
level of effort. In order to encourage the agent to engage in the high
level of effort, the principal must give the agent incentives. In other
models, the principal and agent have different goals. Shirking now
means that the agent pursues her own goals rather than the goals of
the principal; again, the principal must give the agent incentives to
encourage her to achieve the principal's goals. In both models, the
principal cannot directly observe what the agent does and give her a
reward for engaging in a high level of effort and punish her for engaging in a low level of effort. If the principal could do this, the problem would be easily solved. The principal would simply reward the
agent for a high level of effort and punish the agent for a low level of
effort, and the agent would respond by engaging in the high level of
effort.
Because the principal cannot directly observe what the agent
does, the principal can reward or punish her only on the basis of the
observed outcome of her action. But effort and outcome are not perfectly related: This is what makes it difficult for the principal to monitor the agent directly. A high level of effort will thus sometimes lead
to a bad outcome for the principal, and a low level of effort will
sometimes lead to a good outcome for the principal. A principal can
give an agent optimal incentives by rewarding her if the optimal outcome occurs and punishing her if the bad outcome occurs. To maximize her expected payoff, the agent will use the high level of effort
even though there is a chance that the bad outcome will nonetheless
occur, and she will be punished. But many people would turn down
such a scheme. Even if the chance of being rewarded for low effort
(an unfair reward) is equal to the chance to being punished for high
effort (an unfair punishment), a risk-averse agent will be reluctant to
13 See, for example, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-AgentModel 27-30 (Princeton 2001).
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enter into such an agency relationship. In such situations, the principal will have to moderate the reward and punishment to entice the
prospective agent to accept the delegation-in effect, insuring the
agent against the bad outcome. This insurance blunts the agent's incentives, leading a rational agent to invest less effort in the task.
Many areas of immigration law raise information problems that
are frequently addressed through delegation. As we have written
elsewhere, migration policy in large, receiving nations like the United States presents a screening problem." The state would like to control the types of migrants who are admitted-where a migrant's type
refers to characteristics of the migrant that make her desirable to the
state, however those characteristics or a migrant's desirability might
be defined. For example, states often seek migrants who are highly
skilled. These migrants will make money, contribute skills to citizens
they interact with, start businesses, and help finance public goods
through their taxes. Nations also often seek migrants who possess or
are likely to invest in country-specific human capital-that is, skills
that are valuable only within the receiving country. 5 These migrants
include those who speak the dominant language (or can quickly
learn it), have personal connections with existing residents, share the
dominant culture's values, and understand (or can quickly learn) the
prevailing social norms. 6 For many states, such migrants-those who
have skills that are in high demand, or possess country-specific human
capital, or (ideally) both-are considered "good types." The problem
is that a migrant's type is hidden information; the migrant knows her
type but the government does not. The government thus faces what
economists call a hidden information (or screening) problem."
The information problems for the state do not disappear once
the migrants are selected. The state also cares about what the migrants do once they arrive. For example, states often want new migrants to work and make country-specific investments. But not all
migrants will act in this way. States will thus worry that migrants will
arrive and shirk by underinvesting in their country-specific human
capital, by failing to integrate, or worse, by entering the socialwelfare system or turning to crime." Even good types might display
14 See Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 824-27 (cited in note 12).

15 For the definition of country-specific human capital, see id at 828.
16 See id.
17 See Donald J. Smythe, The Scope of a Bargain and the Value of a Promise, 60 SC L
Rev 203, 210 n 43 (2008).
18 See generally Gordon H. Hanson, The Governance of Migration Policy, 11 J Human
Dev & Capabilities 185 (2010) (examining the fiscal incentives of high-income countries with
regard to immigration policy and discussing how fiscal policy drives immigration policy in such
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such bad behavior, though they are less likely to do so than bad

types. The problem for the government is that migrants who engage
in bad behavior may be difficult to detect, punish, and (if necessary)
remove. The government thus faces what economists call a hidden
action (or moral hazard) problem. 9
A state can address these two problems-hidden information
and hidden action-without delegating authority to those outside the

national government. Ex ante, the government can try to screen out
bad types by demanding proof of work and language skills, or requiring migrants to take exams before they are admitted.' Ex post, the
government can screen out bad types by relying on information ac-

quired after the migrant arrives-information about their success in
the labor force, their criminal record, and so forth.' It can also try to
control migrant behavior by employing both carrots and sticksgranting rights to migrants to provide security and encourage investments and integration, for example, or threatening to deport anyone who cannot keep a job.2
Most states, including the United States, employ these approaches.' But they can be supplemented with delegation to agents outside
the national government. Private parties will often have superior information about how productive a migrant might be, about how likely

it is that she will put down roots in the receiving state, and so onabout all of the attributes that the state might consider important to
identifying the good types from within the huge pool of potential migrants. Employers, families, universities, religious organizations, and
others might all fit this bill. In some cases smaller units of government-like US states or local governments -will also have better in-

formation. Moreover, these various potential agents will also often be

nations). See also Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, Introduction.-Threatened People,
Threatened Borders: Migration and U.S. Foreign Policy, in Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron
Weiner, eds, Threatened People, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy 13, 1718 (Norton 1995).
19 See Laffont and Martimort, Theory of Incentives at 145-48 (cited in note 13).
20 See, for example, CIC, Points for Proficiency in English or French-Skilled Workers
and Professionals (Nov 9, 2011), online at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/
factor-language.asp (visited Nov 25, 2012) (describing Canada's method for calculating points
for English- and French-language skills).
21 For an extensive discussion of the choice states face between ex ante and ex post
screening, see Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 824-27, 835-43 (cited in note 12).
22 For a discussion of how states can use rights to encourage investment by migrants, see
Cox and Posner, 84 NYU L Rev at 828-29 (cited in note 12).
23 See, for example, 8 USC §§ 1182, 1227 (specifying conditions under which aliens can be
deported either for committing certain crimes or for violating the terms under which they were
admitted).
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in a better position than the federal government to monitor the migrants and control their behavior after they arrive.
This possibility is often overlooked in discussions of immigration
law. Part of the reason, as we noted above, is that American immigration law is not generally thought to involve much, if any, delegation of
power. Instead, the federal government is typically described as jealously guarding its plenary power over immigration. The structure of
the federal immigration code contributes to this way of thinking. The
INA runs hundreds of pages, leaving the impression that Congress has
laid out, intricately and comprehensively, the rules that govern the
screening and conduct of immigrants.
To be sure, the possibility of delegation has not gone entirely
unnoticed in recent years. One of us has written elsewhere about the
structure of delegation within the national government. ' Moreover,
the surge in scholarship focusing on second-order issues in immigration law has led other scholars to identify particular, isolated instances where immigration enforcement authority has been delegated to
private parties.' But these articles generally conceptualize private
delegation as unusual and as focused almost exclusively on questions
of enforcement -that is, the identification of immigration violators.
As we will show, delegation is not unusual or limited to the periphery of immigration law; delegation is thoroughgoing and affects the
vast majority of immigration decisions. Moreover, delegation does
not exclusively, or even principally, concern enforcement. The national government has given over to private parties authority to
shape core selection decisions in immigration law-to decide what
types of people should have lawful immigrant status in the United
States, not just to identify those who have violated their status.
Our aim in the following Parts is twofold. The first is descriptive:
we explain how three different groups of agents -employers, family
See Cox and Rodriguez, 119 Yale L J at 458 (cited in note 6).
25 See, for example, Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, A Visa to "Snitch": An Addendum
to Cox and Posner,87 Notre Dame L Rev 973, 979-82 (2012) (proposing a system that would
require highly educated "elites" to inform the government of friends and family members who
harbor hatred of the US government as a condition of retaining their visas); Eleanor Marie
Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77 Fordham L Rev 2475, 2491-94
(2009) (arguing that guest worker programs should partially outsource screening to sourcelabor countries, which would generate informal enforcement systems if a country's future visa
quota were tied to compliance rates); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 Stan L Rev 1103, 1105-07 (2009) (asserting that, by rarely punishing the employers of illegal aliens but following through on employers' whistleblowing when an illegally
employed alien becomes undesirable, the government has effectively turned work authorization over to private employers); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws,
96 Georgetown L J 777, 778-80 (2008) (cataloging the proliferation of laws that require private
enforcement by actors such as transportation companies, employers, and landlords).
24
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members, and subfederal units of government-have been given significant control over who gets to come to the United States and over
who is forced to leave, and we explore the scope and limitations of
the delegation to each group of agents. The second goal is theoretical: we provide a framework for analyzing the tradeoffs that the government faces when it is deciding whether, and to what extent, to
delegate immigration authority. Principal-agent theory highlights the
balancing act the national government faces with respect to each
type of agent. The government can take advantage of the superior
information of the agent by giving the agent some power to select
migrants and control their behavior. But because the interests of
agents always diverge, a little or a lot, from the interests of the national government, there are serious costs to giving too much power
to the agents. To show how states can combat these costs, we draw
on an extensive economics literature about designing institutions to
mitigate agency costs.
Consistent with our previous work, this theoretical framework
focuses on second-order design issues rather than first-order policy
goals. It also continues to explore the ways in which the information
problems posed by immigration law are central to the design of immigration institutions. Before proceeding, we should emphasize that
the arguments in the following Parts about the structure of delegation within immigration law are not causal claims. The theoretical
framework we provide can help explain and justify certain patterns
of delegation, but we do not mean to suggest that the theory necessarily explains why the United States has structured immigration
delegation as it has. In some cases-such as with respect to the
spousal-visa requirements -the evolution of legal rules suggests that
the government was in fact focused, at least implicitly, on principalagent issues. In other areas, of course, the evolution of immigration
law is more likely the product of interest-group politics or simple his-

torical happenstance. Irrespective of the origins of delegation in immigration law, however, understanding delegation's theoretical underpinnings is crucial to evaluating the current structure and future
design of American immigration law.
II. EMPLOYERS
A. Labor Immigration Rules
American immigration law contains two tracks for labor migration. The first is for noncitizens who intend to settle permanently in
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the United States-people whom the INA defines as "immigrants. 26
The second track is for putatively temporary workers, who are defined by the INA as "nonimmigrants."" The INA sets aside 140,000
slots per year for the first group and allocates slots according to a
system of five preferences? The first preference is for "[p]riority
workers" consisting of persons of "extraordinary ability," internationally recognized professors and researchers, and executives of
corporations with affiliates in the United States.29 The second preference is for professionals with advanced degrees and exceptionally
talented people in the arts, sciences, and business." The third preference is for skilled workers in short supply and professionals holding
baccalaureate degrees." These three preferences receive most of the
immigration slots, with the fourth and fifth preferences being allocated a smaller number of visas for religious workers, former employees of the US government and international organizations, and
investors who will invest at least $1 million in the US economy and
create at least ten jobs for Americans. 2
Noncitizens seeking admission under the first three categories
must usually be sponsored by an employer. Some persons of extraordinary ability are excused from this requirement, as are certain othersfor example, physicians who agree to work for at least five years in a
part of the country where there is a shortage of health care professionals.3 For those people who are not excused, the employer must submit
a petition for labor certification.' To obtain a labor certification, the
employer must prove that "there are not sufficient workers who are
able, willing, qualified.., and available at the time of application for a
visa.., and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or
unskilled labor," and that "the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the
United States similarly employed."3 To prove that these conditions are
8 USc § 1101(a)(15).
8 USC § 1101(a)(15).
28 8 USC §§ 1151(d)(1), 1153(b). For a general overview of the labor immigration rules,
which are often difficult to deduce from the INA itself, see David Weissbrodt and Laura Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell 154-72 (West 6th ed 2010); Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, et al, Immigrationand Citizenship: Processand Policy 161-66 (West 6th ed
2008).
29 8 USC § 1153(b)(1).
30 8 USC § 1153(b)(2).
31 8 USC § 1153(b)(3).
32 8 USC § 1153(b)(4)-(5). See also Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and
Procedureat 154-58 (cited in note 28).
33 8 USC § 1153(b)(2)(B)(ii).
34 8 USC § 1182(n).
35 8 USC § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i).
26
27
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satisfied, the employer must advertise the exact position-with the
same duties and compensation-and show that no US worker applied
for the job or that those who did apply were unqualified."
If the application for an immigrant worker is approved, she may
settle in the United States. Importantly, the immigrant is not required to stay in the position offered by the sponsoring employer.
She is admitted as a lawful permanent resident (LPR), a visa status
that does not limit the duration of her stay and does not require her
to work at all-let alone for her sponsoring employer-in order to
maintain her visa status. 7
Temporary or nonimmigrant workers are those who do not intend to settle in the United States but plan to return to their country
of origin. These workers are often admitted on H visas, of which approximately 420,000 were issued in 2009." We will focus on two types
of visas: the H-1B visa for workers in "specialty occupations," which
are those which require "a body of highly specialized knowledge";"
and the H-2A visa for workers who will perform temporary or seasonal work, normally in agriculture."
The government issues H-1B visas up to a cap of 65,000, though
the number can-and typically does-exceed that amount because of
various loopholes." These visas are reserved for employees in "specialty occupations."" In order to obtain an H-1B visa, a worker must be
36

8 USC § 1182(n)(1).

37 8 USC § 1101(a)(13)(C).
38 See US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Annual Report on Characteristics of
Specialty Occupational Workers (H-IB) for Fiscal Year 2009 ii (Department of Homeland Security Apr 15, 2010), online at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%
20Studies/H-1B/hlb-fy-09-characteristics.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012) (providing data on H-1B
visas); Randall Monger and Macreadie Barr, Office of Immigration Statistics, Nonimmigrant
Admissions to the United States: 2009 4 (Department of Homeland Security Apr 2010), online
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni-fr-2009.pdf
(visited Nov 25,
2012) (providing data on H-2 visas and the breakdown by type of visa). We should note that
federal estimates of the size of the H visa programs vary. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued two reports for Fiscal Year 2009 that reached different estimates for the total
number of H-1B visas granted, and its estimate for H-2A visas granted (approximately
206,000) differs from the estimates by the Department of State (approximately 100,000) and
the Department of Labor (approximately 250,000). For a collection of these varying figures,
see Global Workers Justice Alliance, Statistics for H2A, H2B, and H2R Visas for 2006-2009 *1
(June 2010), online at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/93294124/Statistics-for-H2A_-H2B_-andH2R-Visas-Overview (visited Nov 25, 2012).
39 8 USC § 1184(i)(1). See also Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure at 200-07 (cited in note 28).
40 See 8 USC § 1188. See also Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure at 200-07 (cited in note 28).
41 See Citizenship and Immigration Services, Characteristicsof H-lB Specialty Occupation Workers at 3 (cited in note 38).
42 8 USC § 1184(i). See also note 69.
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sponsored by an employer." Employers are required to file a labor
condition application, which states that the worker will be paid at least
as much as existing employees in the same occupation, that the position will not harm similarly situated US workers and that the employer is not involved in a labor dispute." H-1B status lasts for three years
and may be extended to six years."' If a person with H-1B status wants
to continue working in the United States after the end of six years,
she must leave the country for one year and then reapply for the visa.
However, an H-1B visa holder may apply for permanent immigration
and will enjoy certain procedural benefits compared to other applicants residing inside or outside the United States."
A temporary worker with H-1B status faces serious restrictions
on job mobility: the baseline rule is that her visa is valid only as long as
she remains employed with the employer who sponsored her.' Unlike
an immigrant worker, therefore, she cannot quit and change jobs
whenever she wants. However, there is some limited visa "portability." A nonimmigrant worker with H-1B status may apply for a job
with an employer who is willing to sponsor her for a new H-1B visa,
and may take that position as soon as the employer files a petition."
Agricultural employers who need seasonal labor may take advantage of the H-2A program.' These workers are admitted for a limited period of less than one year. The workers do not need any special
qualifications-they may be unskilled-but the employer must show
that "there are not sufficient [US] workers who are able, willing, and
qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed" 2 and
that the employment of H-2A workers "will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of workers in the United States- similarly
employed." 3 H-2A workers must be paid the prevailing wage that

43 8 USC § 1184(c).
44 8 USC § 1182(n)(1).
45 8 CFR § 214.2(h).
46 8 USC § 1184(g)(4).
47 See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 ("American
Competitiveness Act"), Pub L 106-313,114 Stat 1251.
48 8 USC § 1184(n)(1) (providing that, if an H-1B holder leaves the employer that sponsored his H-1B and the petition of his next prospective employer is denied, his authorization
status ceases).
49 8 USC § 1184(n)(1).
50 8 USC § 1188.
51 20 CFR § 655.103. See also Department of Labor, Work Authorization for Non-U.S.
Citizens: Temporary Agricultural Workers (H-2A Visas) (Sept 2009), online at
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/taw.htm (visited Nov 25, 2012).
52 8 USC § 1188(a)(1)(A).
53 8 USC § 1188(a)(1)(B).
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would be paid to US workers.' Like H-1B visa holders, H-2A migrants
lack job mobility. But their visas are even more restrictive: during the
term of their visas, H-2A holders are prohibited from seeking new jobs
with different sponsoring employers.5
The central feature of this system is the partial or constrained
delegation of authority to employers to select permanent immigrant
workers and temporary nonimmigrant workers. Employers are given
primary authority to select workers from the vast pool of noncitizens
who seek work in the United States, but they must meet several criteria-including the requirements that the worker have significant
qualifications and not compete with US workers. Another feature of
the system that is of interest is that of portability: immigrant workers
have portability while nonimmigrant workers for the most part lack
portability.
B.

The First-Order Goals of Employment-Migration Policy

To understand why the government might delegate screening
authority to employers, we first need some sense of why the government would want to admit any labor migrants. The first-order goals
of labor migration are likely quite complex, but it is reasonable to assume that the government seeks labor migrants who are productive
and have preferences for public goods that are close to those of the
median citizen. It is also reasonable to assume that the government
wants to avoid migration that reduces the wages of Americans and
causes job loss. But how can the government both seek additional
workers-who by augmenting supply necessarily depress wagesand avoid migration that reduces wages? 6
One possibility is that migrants enter industries for which there
are literally no qualified American workers who will work for any
wage. But there are probably few industries for which this is truetranslation of materials from or into obscure languages may be an
example. It is sometimes said that US citizens will not work as gardeners or nannies or nurses, but that statement is clearly false; the
problem is that US citizens will not work in sufficient numbers at the
prevailing wage rather than at some higher wage. More plausibly, we
54
8 USC § 1188(c)(3)(B)(i). See also 20 CFR § 655.10 (describing the process to determine prevailing wages for temporary labor certification purposes).
55 Consider 8 USC §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 1184(i)(1), 1184(n) (authorizing only H-1B
holders to find new employment).
56 To be sure, there are theoretical conditions where this is possible. One possibility is
that migrants are perfect complements (rather than substitutes) for domestic workers. Another
possibility is that migrants will augment the demand for domestically produced goods, leading to

higher wages for US workers, although not necessarily those in the same industry as the migrant.
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might imagine that some domestic industries are periodically hit by
shocks that greatly augment the demand for their products and
hence the demand for labor. The classic example was the dot-com

boom, which resulted from the development of the Internet." As
firms competed for software engineers, the wages of American software engineers skyrocketed. 8 The migration of vast numbers of foreign software engineers, mainly from South Asia, would, of course,
suppress domestic wages relative to what they would have been in
the absence of the migration-but those wages would have risen
more slowly rather than declined-and migration would not have
caused unemployment." For that reason, resistance among US workers to the migration would likely have been minimal. At the same

time, employers, consumer groups, and businesses that use computer
products would have a strong interest in lower prices (or higher profits, in the case of employers) and for that reason would support the
migration.' Thus, permitting short-term migration following exogenous shocks that increase the demand for labor is perhaps the easiest
case from the government's perspective.
There are several problems with this theory as an explanation of
American labor-migration policy. First, the quotas for temporary employment visas are in practice quite sticky. While the quotas are occasionally changed by Congress-the dot-con boom being one example-for the most part they remain unchanged year after year, even
while labor market conditions are fluctuating significantly." Second,

57 See John Schwartz, Dot-Com is Dot-Gone, and the Dream with It, NY Times section 9
at 1 (Nov 25, 2001) (discussing the dot-corn boom and its subsequent bust).
58 See Chris Murphy, Global CIO: Modest SalariesOffer Tech Bubble Reality Check, InformationWeek (May 20, 2011), online at http://www.informationweek.com/news/global
-cio/interviews/229600667 (visited Nov 25, 2012).
59 See Norman Matloff, High-Tech Cheap Labor, Wash Post A35 (Sept 12, 2000) (discussing lobbying by computer industry CEOs to raise the quota for H-1B work visas in response to increased demand for high-tech laborers during the dot-corn boom); John P. De New
and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Native Wage Impacts of Foreign Labor: A Random Effects Panel
Analysis, 7 J Population Econ 177, 191 (1994) (examining the labor market impacts of foreign
workers on native worker salary and unemployment figures).
60 See Norman Matloff, High-Tech Trojan Horse: H-1B Visas and the Computer Industry
(Center for Immigration Studies Sept 1999), online at http://www.cis.org/ComputerIdunstry
Visas-hib (visited Nov 25, 2012) (discussing the tech industry's lobbying efforts to raise the H1B quota and the resulting legislation); New Workers for Economic Growth Act, S 1440, 106th
Cong, 1st Sess (1999) (proposing legislation to increase the H-1B visa quota); Bringing Resources from Academia to the Industry of Our Nation Act, HR 2687, 106th Cong, 1st Sess
(1999) (proposing legislation to extend the duration of H-1B visas).
61 See American Competitiveness Act § 102, 114 Stat at 1251-52 (raising the H-1B limit to
195,000 for FY 2001 to 2003). For annual reports on H-1B quotas and petitions, see US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Reports and Studies, online at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextoid=9ald9ddf8Olb321OVgnVC
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the same industries tend to receive most of the H-1B and H-2A workers year after year.62 This makes it look like the programs are more the
product of interest-group politics and inertia. Third, a theory grounded in labor-market shocks cannot account for the large-scale system of
permanent labor migration. Permanent migration appears instead to
reflect a goal of improving the aggregate stock of human capital.
As this thumbnail sketch suggests, the wage and employment effects of labor migration are extremely complicated and contested.
Nonetheless, the INA appears to reflect the twin goals of (1) increasing the labor supply in response to labor shortages (that in theory are
most likely to arise in response to exogenous shocks to the labor
market) and (2) upgrading the stock of human capital available to
domestic employers even in the absence of any shortage of workers.
In what follows, we explore what structure of delegation can best advance these first-order goals.
C.

The Advantages of Delegation to Employers

Employers will generally have better information than the government about the quality (in particular, the productivity) of potential applicants. Employers can better evaluate credentials, such as diplomas, and the quality of the match between the applicant's talents
and the employer's needs. In addition, the employer will have better
information about the local labor market-that is, the availability of
US workers who could perform the same job. It is possible, although
less certain, that employers will be in a better position than the government to evaluate the applicant's preferences about public goods,
which may be revealed through interviews and other parts of the application process.
Employers do not always have informational advantages. In
general, the advantages will be greater if the government is interested in using labor migration to ameliorate transitory labor shortages
within particular job sectors or where the government has independent reasons to want to structure labor migration as a matching of
prospective immigrant employees to specific employers. Where the
government is interested instead in using labor migration to augment
the supply of human capital within the state, the informational advantages of the employers are somewhat weaker. This is because the
M100000b92ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=9ald9ddf8Olb321OVgnVCMlOOOOOb92ca6OaRCRD
(visited Nov 25, 2012).
62 See John Miano, H-1B Visa Numbers: No Relationship to Economic Need (Center for
Immigration Studies June 2008), online at http://www.cis.org/HlbVisaNumbers (visited Nov
25, 2012) (examining the consistency of the breakdown of H-1B visas allocated by industry).

1302

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:1285

firm-specific job requirements about which the employer has clearly
superior information are less relevant if the goal is to pick migrants
who have skills or training that will, over the long run, benefit the
state.
Employers may also have fewer informational advantages when
the government seeks to expand the pool of what is generally referred to as unskilled labor. In the immigration code and the economic literature, unskilled workers are typically those without specialized training or educational credentials. Sometimes these workers
are admitted for jobs that require skill even though they involve no
specialized training or educational prerequisites -jobs where some
workers will be vastly more productive than others. Cane cutters
admitted to Florida as part of the H-2A program are often said to
constitute such workers. 3 But in other cases unskilled workers are
admitted to perform jobs that require little skill of any sort and for
which the productivity differences among employees are negligible.
In such cases the employers have little to contribute to the screening
process because there are few skills differences among workers for
the employer to detect.
A government that wants to capitalize on the informational advantages of employers is therefore likely to delegate to employers
more-or will delegate in a less constrained fashion-for temporary
migrants than for permanent migrants and for skilled migrants than
for unskilled migrants.
D. The Disadvantages of Delegation
Employers do not necessarily or even usually share all the interests of the government. As we have explained above, the government
likely seeks labor immigrants (or nonimmigrants) who will advance
productivity, share the policy preferences of the majority, and be able
to live and prosper in the United States.' Employers seek workers
who advance productivity alone. In addition, the government may
have reasons to favor certain industries or groups of workers; employers as a group obviously do not and could not share these interests.
To see the problem, consider a system where the government
determined the number of migrants to be admitted in a given yearsay, 100,000-and then distributed slots at random to employers or
sold them by auction. Employers would then choose to fill the slots
however they wanted to. Employers would choose migrants with the
63
64

See Glyn James, Sugarcane 165 (Blackwell 2d ed 2004).
See Part I.B.
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highest level of productivity for positions that need to be filled. But
in most cases employers would not consider the migrants' policy
preferences-for example, whether they share American civic ideals
or instead harbor authoritarian and intolerant political preferences.
Employers will also not take account of the various costs that workers may impose on society if they quit or are fired. In the case of
permanent migrants, these costs may be considerable because unemployed workers will often qualify for at least some public assistance.'
And even in the case of temporary migrant workers, these costs will
often be high because workers may overstay their visas. A specialized translator of technical manuals into Urdu may not be able to
find another job if he is fired and may instead become a public
charge.
Employers could shirk in other ways. Employers will invest resources into screening where the marginal costs equal the marginal
benefits for the employer, not for society. An intensive screening
procedure will not be cost-effective for the employer if it can identify
highly productive people with adequate probability simply on the basis of their diplomas. The employer may expect to employ the worker for, say, five years on average, in which case the downside from
misjudging the productivity of the worker will be limited to a lost
opportunity for five years. But if the worker can stay beyond five
years, then an intensive screening process will benefit future employers (who, in the case of low-productivity workers, will be spared
the cost of screening if the first employer had screened them out).
However, the first employer has no incentive to take these benefits
into account.
Finally, when the worker arrives, the employer will have strong incentives to encourage the worker to invest in firm-specific human capital, not country-specific human capital. At the end of the three or five
years, the worker may therefore be highly productive at the workplace
for which she was sponsored but not at any other workplace in the
country. And the employer has no incentive to teach her skills that will
make her a productive citizen. For this reason, an employer-based
65 LPRs are prohibited from receiving some federal benefits until they have resided in
the United States for five years. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 403, Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105, 2265-67, codified at 8 USC § 1613.
But other federal benefits are available immediately, and state governments often extend the
social safety net to LPRs prior to their eligibility for federal benefits. See Aleinikoff, et al, Immigration and Citizenship at 1228-32 (cited in note 28) (listing initial exceptions to the fiveyear bar and describing subsequent statutes that relaxed the bar in additional situations); id at
1246-47 ("[M]ore than half of the states provide benefits to at least some noncitizens who are
ineligible for federal services.").
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sponsorship system is more suitable for temporary migration than for
permanent migration.
These considerations suggest a rough prediction about the appropriate degree of delegation for different types of foreign workers.
Because permanent workers produce benefits and costs for the state
well beyond their period of employment with the sponsoring employer, delegation should be greater for temporary workers than for
permanent migrants. This point reinforces our earlier argument that
because employers' informational advantages over the government
will be greater for temporary migrants than for permanent migrants,
delegation should be greater for temporary migrants.'
E. The Structure of Employment Delegation
From society's standpoint, the optimal immigration law will take
advantage of the employer's superior information while preventing
the employer from shirking. But how can the government capitalize
on the employer's superior capacity for screening migrants and simultaneously prevent the employer from choosing migrants who serve
the employer's private interest but harm the public's interest? The
above discussion suggests a few design principles-such as delegating
greater authority over temporary rather than permanent labor visas.
More generally, we can see that immigration law will sometimes
need to give the employer an incentive to screen migrants well by offering a reward, while at the same time constrain the reward or impose sanctions in order to deter the employer from choosing privately beneficial but socially harmful workers. The following discussion
considers how immigration rules might be designed to accomplish
those goals.
1. Nondelegation: Merit-based point systems.
To begin, let us consider a baseline system without delegation.
A number of countries use a merit-based point system to screen
(permanent) migrants, 7 and such an approach has been proposed for
See Part II.C.
Examples include Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. See CIC, Six Selection Factors
(cited in note 10); Immigration New Zealand, The Skilled Migrant Category Points Indicator
(Aug 12, 2011), online at http://www.immigration.govt.nz/pointsindicator (visited Nov 25,
2012); Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Professionalsand Other Skilled Migrants:
What Is the Points Test?, online at http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled-migration/
points-test.htm (visited Nov 25, 2012). For an overview of point systems, see Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Madeleine Sumption, Rethinking Points Systems and Employer-Selected Immigration 1-8 (Migration Policy Institute June 2011), online at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
pubs/rethinkingpointssystem.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012).
66
67
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the United States as well. Under a 2007 bill, applicants would be assigned points according to various criteria that emphasize domestic
labor demand, skills, education, and compatibility.' For example, an
applicant who could be employed in a "specialty occupation"6 would
receive twenty points, an applicant who could be employed in a highdemand occupation would receive sixteen points, and an applicant
who could be employed in the sciences and related fields would receive eight points.' Applicants also would receive points for US
work experience, English-speaking ability, relatives in the United
States, success on a US civics exam, and advanced educational attainment-for example, twenty points for an advanced graduate degree and five points for a certified vocational degree.71
Point systems are attractive because they enable a country to
choose people directly on the basis of criteria that matter from a social standpoint. As we saw, employers may seek highly productive
workers but they do not take account of the costs and benefits of
workers for society outside the workplace (including after they quit
and take a new job). 7 Importers of unskilled agricultural labor, for
example, may not care that the workers cannot speak English; but
these workers may have trouble integrating themselves into American society without English-language skills. Under a point system,
the government makes the trade-off between productivity and assimilability directly and embodies the trade-off in an algorithm that better serves the public interest.
However, we are skeptical of the utility of point systems. In a
market economy, the highest-valued workers are not necessarily those
with the highest educational attainments. The highest-value workers
are those in industries where demand greatly exceeds the supply of
workers. When demand spikes (or supply declines), wages will rise as
well, and that will encourage US workers to move into the industry.
So, even when labor shortages open up, they can close quickly. The
government can try to determine where the shortages are located by
conducting surveys and engaging in statistical analysis, but it cannot

68 S 1639, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (2007) (proposing legislation to provide for comprehensive
immigration reform). See also Aleinikoff, et al, Immigration and Citizenship at 460-62 (cited in
note 28).
69 The INA defines a "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires "theoretical
and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into
the occupation in the United States." 8 USC § 1184(i)(1).
70 See Aleinikoff, et al, Immigration and Citizenship at 461-62 (cited in note 28).
71
Id.
72 See Part lI.D.
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foresee the future as well as employers with experience in the field
and will at best be able to aggregate information in a crude fashion.
The case for delegation rests on the assumption that employers are in
a better position to understand their labor needs than the government
is. The government can superimpose other requirements (such as English-language ability) in order to minimize the risk that employers will
choose people who are ill equipped to live in the country or integrate,
but there is no reason to abandon delegation altogether. 3
Even if the government is interested not only in solving the problem of labor shortages, and instead also wants to add human capital to
the country, it is not clear the state is best equipped to pick those who
will be the most economically productive and socially beneficial. Certainly it is easier for the state to do so with respect to highly educated
people because at least in those contexts there are objective criteria
like awarded degrees and English-language ability. But these are often
crude measures, in the same way that LSAT scores and undergraduate
GPAs only crudely predict who will become the most successful lawyers. The US government is not well equipped to determine whether a
degree in economics from a university in Taiwan is equivalent to a degree in economics from a university in Norway, South Africa, or Peru.
It is even less able to evaluate work experience in different types of
firms in different places around the world. Employers have specialized
experience in evaluating candidates for employment and therefore are
in a stronger position than the state to determine the quality of migrants' human capital.
2. Employer sponsorship.
One could argue that, even if employers have better information
about migrant types than the government does, the best system
would be one in which employers provide that information to the
government and then the government acts on it. The government
could, for example, conduct surveys of employers' labor needs, aggregate the information, and then allocate visas on the basis of what
it learns.
The problem with such a system is that employers have no incentive to provide accurate information to the government. All employers
benefit from a large labor pool, and so all employers will have a strong
73 Consider Papademetriou and Sumption, Rethinking Points Systems at 3 (cited in note
67) (criticizing points systems because arriving workers often are unable to find jobs). This is
consistent with our point that the points systems do not necessarily select the most valuable
workers, but their immediate concern could be addressed with a dual requirement that migrants who are qualified on the basis of points must still obtain a job prior to receiving a visa.
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incentive to tell the government that they face labor shortages even
when they do not. The government might admit low-value workers as
well as high-value workers, but employers could engage in sorting if
and when they decide they need to hire more people; thus, employers
can avoid these sorting costs if they decide that they do not need additional employees. If the government follows the advice of employers,
it will either end up admitting too many workers or allocating visas
randomly rather than to the most productive workers.
Employer sponsorship solves this problem by requiring employers to bear some of the cost of admission. Employers must incur the
cost of identifying particular migrants and of complying with bureaucratic procedures if they want the US government to issue visas for
prospective employees. Employers will incur these sponsorship costs
only if they expect a benefit from them, which means that they actually expect to hire the worker and obtain returns high enough to
cover the costs. Sponsorship rules should greatly reduce admission of
low-value workers.
3. Temporary and permanent workers.
In the US system of delegation, one major distinction is that between temporary and permanent workers. Temporary and permanent workers have different purposes: in theory, temporary workers
augment the labor supply after an exogenous shock causes wages to
rise, while permanent workers augment the population with people
who have valuable skills and politically compatible preferences. Employers will internalize more of the costs and benefits of temporary
workers simply because temporary workers are more likely to remain with the employer during their entire stay, while permanent
workers are more likely to find another job. Thus, it makes sense to
give employers who hire temporary workers greater screening authority than employers who hire permanent workers.
The law reflects this conclusion in three ways. First, the quality
standards for admitting permanent workers are higher than the standards for admitting temporary workers." Thus, an employer may screen
74 For empirical evidence, see US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Approval and
Denial Statistics for 1-140, Immigrant Petitionsfor Alien Workers (DHS Feb 28, 2011), online at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f64176543f6dla/?vgnextoi
d=2be702798785e210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=cdfd2f8b69583210Vgn
VCM100000082ca6OaRCRD (visited Nov 25, 2012) (listing approval and denial rates for petitions for classification as an "Alien of Extraordinary Ability," the first preference category for
permanent workers; the yearly acceptance rate ranges from 49 to 62 percent from 2005 to
2010). Compare US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report at
ii, 4 table 1 (cited in note 38) (listing an approval rate for H-1B temporary visas of 87 percent
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in relatively low-quality workers for three to six years, but not permanently. Second, although the employer of temporary migrants must
prove that the applicant will receive the prevailing wage" and that her
presence will not harm US workers," it need not attempt recruitment
of Americans for the position, as is required by the labor-certification
process for permanent workers." Third, workers admitted on a temporary basis must generally leave the country early if they lose their posi-

tion with the sponsoring employer.7 ' This means that employers can
admit temporary workers only to the extent that those workers continue to work for the sponsoring employer. There is no such condition
for employers who screen in permanent workers.
4. Portability.
Under the INA, temporary labor visas significantly restrict the
labor mobility of migrants. For some visa categories workers are categorically prohibited from quitting and finding a new job in the
United States. 9 The visa is tied to the employee's sponsoring em-

ployer, and he cannot be sponsored for a new visa unless he departs
the United States. The H-1B visa relaxes these restrictions a bit,"' but
all temporary visas come with limited portability at best.
These post-entry restrictions on labor mobility have complex effects on the incentives of the employer and the temporary worker.
Because the worker often cannot quit and find a new job, the employer can underpay her after she has arrived and in this way earn

in FY 2009), with H-2A Re-engineering, Braceros, 15 Rural Migration News (UC Davis Jan
2009), online at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1408_04 _0 (visited Nov 25,
2012) (indicating that 97 percent of employer applications and 96 percent of the jobs employers
wanted to fill with H-2A workers were approved in FY 2007 and noting that "[u]nlike the H1B ... program[], there is no cap or ceiling on the number of H-2A visas that can be issued").
75 8 USC §§ 1188(c)(3)(B)(i), 1182(n)(1)(A)(i)(II). See also 20 CFR § 655.10 (describing
process to determine prevailing wages for temporary labor certification purposes); 8 USC
§ 1182(n)(3)(A)(i).
76 8 USC § 1188(a)(1)(B).
77 8 USC § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i).
78

8 USC§ 1184(n).

See, for example, 8 USC § 1188(i)(1) (requiring, for H-2A eligibility, that a migrant
not be an "unauthorized alien"); 8 USC § 1324a(h)(3) (defining an "unauthorized alien" as one
who is neither "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" nor "authorized to be so employed"). This indicates that a migrant must be pre-authorized for employment to be eligible
for an H-2A visa-as such, a migrant cannot quit her current job and seek alternate employment within the United States.
80 See 8 USC § 1184(n) (providing that H-1B visa holders are "authorized to accept new
employment upon the filing by the prospective employer of a new petition on behalf of such
nonimmigrant," but also providing that "[i]f the new petition is denied, such authorization shall
cease").
79

2012]

Delegation in Immigration Law

1309

rents on the admission.81 By the same token, because potential migrants know that they may be underpaid and without recourse, they
may be reluctant to apply for visas in the first place. The employer
and worker may mitigate this effect by contract but, as always, it is
not clear that a contract can anticipate all future contingencies or
that the worker will, as a practical matter, be able to enforce it after
she has returned to her home country.
The lack of portability might be defended as a method for rewarding employers for undertaking the task of screening on behalf of
the government. The employer must invest in finding foreign workers that suit its needs and then must underwrite the cost of the migration process. An employer will not incur these costs unless it can be
guaranteed a return-in the form of wages that are below the prevailing American wages. To be sure, employers face a similar problem when they try to recruit domestic workers: they may incur considerable expense in finding and recruiting workers, hire them, and
then lose them to a competitor a short time later. But this problem is
more significant for migrant workers. In domestic contexts, prospective employees apply for positions because they want the position. In
the visa context, however, they often have twin motivations: they
want the job, but they also want the visa. Once they have received
the visa, therefore, there should be a higher probability that they will
choose to leave the initial employer than there would be for an employee hired in a purely domestic context. Thus, by coupling one's
ability to enter the United States to one's ability to get a labor visa,
the INA introduces a distortion into the employer-employee matching market-in the form of strategic behavior by prospective employees. This distortion might lower the employer's incentive to
screen, and so can be offset by restricting visa portability, thereby
permitting the employer to obtain above-market rents. In addition, if
the employer rather than the temporary migrant receives the surplus,
that money will ultimately benefit (mostly) Americans (shareholders, customers who receive lower prices) rather than (mostly) foreigners, who will benefit from remittances and the worker's expenditures after she returns to her country.
However, the lack of portability also creates a deadweight loss:
Workers may have difficulty moving to employers where they would
be more productive. Even if the visa system were restructured so
that employees could pay prior employers to release them, this anticipated cost would suppress the incentive to apply for temporary

81

See Papademetriou and Sumption, Rethinking Points Systems at 4 (cited in note 67).
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work in the first place. The employer will also have a perverse incentive to overinvest in the worker's firm-specific human capital rather
than in her country-specific human capital, so as to minimize her
ability to find another sponsor and switch jobs. Moreover, the incentive system is crude. Employers receive a payoff that increases with
the productivity of the worker, which will encourage employers to
choose the best workers but not necessarily the workers who produce positive externalities in the form of conformity to the law and
other characteristics or activities.
Possibly reflecting this concern, Congress amended the portability rule in 2000 so that temporary workers can move to new employers when they file a petition for a new H-1B visa rather than when
their petition is accepted (as required under the old rule).' This
amendment mitigates the negative effects of a lack of portability but
does not eliminate them. Of course, it also undermines any benefits
that flow from labor-mobility restrictions.
5. The labor-shortage requirement.
The central question in immigration applications is whether the
applicant seeks a position for which there is a labor shortage. In
some cases, the government lists occupations for which it believes
that shortages exist.' In other cases, the employer must prove that a
shortage exists by showing that it cannot find a US worker willing to
fill the position even though the employer offers the position at the
"prevailing wage."' The prevailing-wage standard is nonsensical. If a
prevailing wage exists, then US workers would be willing to fill the
job (at that wage). And if the employer must pay the prevailing wage
to the migrant (as it must), then the employer gains no benefit by
hiring that person-hiring the person does not reduce labor costs.
We suspect that employers manipulate the prevailing wage requirement by paying foreign workers less than US workers are willing to
accept."
82 See American Competitiveness Act § 105, 114 Stat at 1253, codified at 8 USC
§ 1184(n) (increasing the portability of H-1B status by allowing a nonimmigrant's employment
status to continue until her new petition is adjudicated).
83 The Department of Labor lists such occupations on Schedule A. See 20 CFR § 656.5
(including nurses, physical therapists, and a few other job categories).
84 See 8 USC § 1188(a)(1)(A) (requiring the employer to show a labor shortage); 8 USC
§ 1188(c)(3)(B)(i) (requiring the employer to pay the prevailing wage).
85 On both theories, labor migration will depress US wages. For some suggestive evidence, see Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America
142-43 (Princeton 2004) (arguing that the Bracero guest-worker program in the 1940s coincided with stagnation of farm wages in the South over the next few decades).
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One theory for a labor-shortage requirement is that, in the absence of such a requirement, employers would sponsor migrant
workers who impose high negative externalities on society, for example, people likely to become criminals or public charges, or people who will likely fail to assimilate in other ways. To minimize these
costs, the government might authorize employers to sponsor migrant
workers only when they generate a relatively high surplus-which
will be partly enjoyed by employers and partly transformed into public revenue through the tax system. But if this is the goal of the laborshortage requirement, it would need to be transformed so that it
makes economic sense. As we discussed in Part ILB, a revised laborshortage requirement could limit visas except when an exogenous
shock increases the demand for labor well beyond historical levels, as
in the case of the dot-com boom in the 1990s. When labor demand
exceeds supply, the surplus generated by hiring will be greater than
normal, and thus the tax revenues benefiting society will be greater
than normal as well. These increased tax revenues would offset the
negative externalities from the migration.
On this approach, however, the labor-shortage requirement is
poorly designed and should be changed. Instead of requiring the employer to prove that it cannot find a US worker at the prevailing
wage (which is impossible), the government should require the employer to show that the wages of US workers in the relevant industry
have increased at historically unprecedented rates. In theory, the
precise threshold would be the rate at which the extra tax revenue
(and other benefits) from hiring a migrant exceeds the expected negative externalities associated with that migrant. In practice, the government would need to use a cruder threshold, but we expect that
one could be formulated, based on historically abnormal wage increases and similar factors.
Another view is that the current system is adequate because its
overall effect is to impose a cost on employers, which will discourage
them from hiring marginal migrant workers who would impose negative externalities greater than their benefits. If the labor certification
requirement is a sham, then employers must satisfy it by paying a lot
of money to lawyers, consultants, and others, so as to provide the documentary evidence that will satisfy the immigration authorities. This
is, in effect, a tax. It follows that employers will decline to sponsor migrant workers who contribute only marginally to their profits and will
focus their energies on sponsoring migrant workers who contribute a
great deal to their profits -professionals like computer programmers
rather than, say, factory workers. Assuming that negative externalities
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among potential migrant workers do not vary much, then a system
that admits high-surplus workers and rejects low-surplus workers is
more likely to be socially beneficial than one that does not distinguish
them.
If labor certification operates as a tax, society would do better if
employers paid an actual cash tax to the Treasury rather than, in effect, burning money on paperwork. Additionally, the tax should not
be a constant amount but should be a function of the negative externalities that a migrant worker imposes on society. If some migrant
workers impose high negative externalities, then the employer
should be required to pay a high tax; when migrant workers do not
impose negative externalities, the tax should be low or zero.
There is a tension between enlisting employers in the screening
process by encouraging them to sponsor migrants and penalizing them
for sponsoring migrants because they create negative externalities.
Earlier, we suggested that the portability rule encouraged employers
to sponsor high-value workers by giving employers a large portion of
the surplus generated by employment. If employers went to the expense of sponsoring a worker, and then the worker immediately quit
and found work with a competitor, employers would not sponsor
workers in the first place. But if we believe that workers impose negative externalities, then we should tax employers who sponsor migrants.
How do we resolve this tension?
An indirect solution is to permit the employer to capture
enough of the surplus that it is worthwhile to sponsor the migrant
while supplying the rest of the surplus to the government to offset
any costs the migrant imposes on the state. As we noted above, the
portability rule is probably too crude for this purpose. Portability restrictions encourage an employer to invest more in screening because
the surplus captured by the employer is correlated with the productivity of the migrant it picks. But this incentive is undercut by the fact
that portability restrictions also reduce the migrant's bargaining
power, which may allow the employer to pay the migrant a wage that
is below the US market rate. Moreover, a truly incentive-compatible
rule would reward employers for directly taking into account the potential social externalities produced by the immigrant worker, and
nothing in the portability rules does this.
6. Ex ante and ex post screening: The transition from
temporary to permanent status.
A traditional rule is that foreign workers who seek temporary status must attest that they do not intend to seek permanent residence.
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They must lack immigrant intent in order to receive the visa.' A related rule is that holders of H-1B visas had to have a permanent foreign
residence. "7 Both rules have eroded over the years.'
These rules were likely driven by the concern that foreign workers would game the system by first obtaining a temporary visa and
then, once in the United States, taking advantage of a path to citizenship. For example, it would be easier for someone in the United States
for three years to arrange a sham marriage with a US citizen than for
someone living in a foreign country where access to potential American spouses is more limited. Or some people might plan to overstay
their visa and hope for an amnesty, which periodically recurs. Or they
might hope that contact with American employers will make it more
likely that they will be able to persuade an employer to sponsor them
for a permanent labor visa. To screen out such people, the law required evidence that they planned to return to their home country after their visa expired, and had a financial reason-such as a foreign
residence -to do so."
Why might these rules have eroded? One possible reason is that
often the best evidence of a person's suitability as a permanent resident comes from her experience on American soil. Indeed, many
people who spend three years in the United States may voluntarily
return home because they decide they prefer to live in their native
country. Among those who seek permanent residency, their experiences in the United States-whether they obtained and kept a job,
paid taxes, avoided crime, learned English, or were integrated into
their communities-provide useful evidence as to the likelihood that
they will continue to be successful as permanent residents. As we
have discussed elsewhere, the immigration system has therefore
gradually undergone a transformation into a two-period approach,
where migrants have more limited rights during a probationary period, successful completion of which facilitates application for permanent residence."
The delegation question reemerges with respect to secondperiod evaluations of people who have already entered the United
States on temporary visas and seek to remain permanently. Again,
USC § ll01(a)(15)(B), (F), (J).
See 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(O)(ii)(IV).
88 See Aleinikoff, et al, Immigration and Citizenship at 400-01 (cited in note 28) (describing the "dual intent doctrine," which provides that "a desire to remain in [the United States]
permanently in accordance with the law ... is not necessarily inconsistent with lawful nonimmigrant status"), citing Matter of Hosseinpour,15 I&N Dec 191, 192 (BIA 1975).
89
See 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(O)(ii)(IV).
90 See Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 824-27 (cited in note 12).
86 See 8
87
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the state could directly evaluate the migrant by monitoring her behavior while on American soil. The state could question her directly
about her activities, such as whether she committed crimes, held a
job, learned English, made friends, and so forth; and in many cases,
her answers could be verified by giving her tests and examining government records (for example, criminal records). The state could also delegate or partly delegate this ex post screening decision to
agents such as employers, and indeed this is what happens in the
United States. An employer effectively provides for the removal of
the visa holder by firing her before her time has expired (unless she
finds another sponsor); it could also help a temporary worker obtain
permanent status by sponsoring her for a green card."
Why would the government give the employer the de facto
power to deport migrant workers through the act of firing them (or
failure to sponsor them for green cards)? One possibility is that if the
migrant is not a suitable worker for the sponsoring employer, then
she is most likely not a suitable worker for any US employer. If the
employer has better information about the worker's human capital,
this rough judgment may well be good enough for public policy purposes. In addition, if the employer fires the worker not because of
poor quality but because of poor economic conditions, then there is a
risk that the worker will become a public charge, depress wages, or
contribute to unemployment during an economic downturn, when
there is often political hostility toward foreign workers. This view
that temporary admission can serve as a probationary period, which
permits better evaluation of the "quality" of the migrant, can be contrasted to a more popular view, which is that temporary migrants
should be given permanent residence because they develop affiliations in the United States.' If this latter view is correct, then the twoperiod approach imposes an unacceptable hardship on migrants, and
instead they should either be denied entry or be given permanent
residence from the start. Whatever the merits of this idea, one should
be clear that it has significant costs, as it deprives the state of important information for evaluating potential migrants, whose experiences in the state can provide a basis for determining their suitability
as citizens.
91 See, for example, 8 USC §§ 1182, 1227 (specifying conditions under which aliens can
be deported for violating the terms under which they were admitted); 8 USC § 1255 (discussing
rules and procedures for the adjustment of status from nonimmigrant to that of a person admitted for permanent residence).
92 For an example of the more popular view, see Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States 80-114 (Oxford 2006),
citing Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365 (1971).

20121

Delegation in ImmigrationLaw

1315

F.

Choosing and Coordinating Multiple Agents
We have so far abstracted from a significant problem with delegation. By assuming that the government delegates to a single employer, we have avoided the question of how the government should
choose among the thousands of employers who could serve as
screening agents.
Imagine that the government has determined that 100,000 slots
should be made available for permanent workers.' All employers
would apply for these slots. Under a baseline randomization system,
the slots would be randomly assigned to employers. If one million
employers each apply for a single slot, then each employer would be
given a one-in-ten chance of obtaining a slot. Of course, if employers
can apply for more than one slot, they will strategically apply for
more slots than they need in order to increase their chances of winning at least one in the lottery. In order to avoid these types of strategic behavior, employers' applications would be subject to a ceiling-for example, one that is determined by the size of the firm.
A randomization system would be quite crude because it would
not ensure that the highest-value workers end up at the highest-value
employers. Those employers who obtained a slot would search out
the highest-value workers for them, but it is possible that those
workers would be more suited for different employers who did not
win the lottery, or that different worker-employer matchups would
be more productive. This problem could be ameliorated if the slots
were tradable. Employers with higher-value opportunities would
then buy slots from employers who won the lottery.
Current immigration law in the United States resembles a randomization system. All employers may seek slots; if they seek more
than are available, the slots are distributed at randomY. There are a
few additional screening elements that increase the cost for the employer. Employers must show that the migrant is (in most cases)
highly educated and skilled, and hence highly productive. In addition, the employers must obtain a labor certification that shows (or
purports to show) that employment of the migrant will not lower the
wages of Americans or cause unemployment. The high cost and
trouble of negotiating the immigration bureaucracy may serve as a
limited screening mechanism, ensuring that employers will not attempt to obtain slots for workers who fall below a threshold of
93 We could also imagine a system in which the government delegated to employers the
power to decide how many migrants to admit in the first place, but such an approach is sufficiently remote to present day realities that it can be safely ignored.
94 See 8 USC § 1153(e)(2).
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productivity. There is a great deal of skepticism about whether the
labor certification system works as intended, however.95
A more direct approach would be for the government to auction
off the slots. Now, the highest-value employers would purchase the
slots, and those highest-value employers would import the highestvalue workers for their positions. Although auctions must be carefully
designed, and can be gamed, an auction would be superior to the baseline randomization system.
Legal scholars and economists have occasionally suggested the
possibility of auctioning employment visas.' But they have always assumed that the workers themselves would bid for the visas; to our
knowledge, no one has considered an approach in which employers
rather than workers bid for visas. An employer-centered approach
has a number of advantages. First, employers will face fewer capital
constraints than foreign workers who, without a source of capital,
may not be able to bid very high for visas. (Economists typically assume away the migrants' capital constraints by stipulating that they
can borrow against their future earnings, but there are many reasons
to think that employers will face fewer capital constraints than overseas migrants, given how credit markets actually function.) Second,
employers have considerably better information about employment
opportunities in the United States than potential migrants do. Third,
the employer auction would represent a relatively small change to
the existing labor immigration system, while a direct auction to migrants strikes many people as a radical, and politically infeasible,
change to immigration law.
III. FAMILIES
A. Family-Reunification Rules

Today family reunification is a core feature of American immigration law. Historically, however, it played a much smaller role.
When Congress first enacted general numerical restrictions on immigration law in the wake of World War I, the quota system was based
95 See Papademetriou and Sumption, Rethinking Points Systems at 4-5 (cited in note 67).
Concerns about whether the migrant will conform to American norms and values are addressed in other ways-for example, the removal of those who commit crimes. See Cox and
Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 819-21 (cited in note 12).
96 See, for example, Gary S. Becker, The Challenge of Immigration-A Radical Solution
27 (Institute of Economic Affairs 2010), online at http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/
files/publications/files/IEA%20Challenge%20of%20Immigration%20web.pdf (visited Nov 25,
2012) (proposing that anyone who pays a fee be admitted as a migrant); Julian L. Simon, The
Economic Consequencesof Immigration 357-64 (Michigan 2d ed 1999).
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on national origin.' While some limited family-based migration was
permitted,98 the modern migration categories-under which the vast
majority of visas are allocated on the basis of labor demand or family
connections-did not exist.
Congress abolished the national origins quota system in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965" ("Hart-Celler Act") and put
in place a new framework for allocating visas. The new framework
relied primarily on family-based migration:"° nearly three-fourths of
the visas were allocated for qualifying relatives.'" Today, nearly half
of all the visas awarded for permanent residence each year are
awarded under this system."
The family-based visa allocation rules are exceedingly intricate,
involving a number of different preference categories and complex
quota formulas." To understand the basic structure, however, it is important to recognize that all family-based visas must begin with a petition by a sponsoring relative already living in the United States."'
Thus, one must distinguish between two important questions: (1)
Which existing residents are permitted to sponsor their family members for visas, and (2) who may be sponsored for a visa by a resident
family member?
Both citizens and LPRs are permitted to sponsor relatives for
family-based visas. But the immigration code treats citizens more favorably than LPRs. First, citizens are exempt from numerical restrictions on visas when they seek to bring in their "immediate relatives" -defined as spouses, unmarried minor children, and (in some

97 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 21-55 (cited in note 85).
98
See, for example, The Emergency Quota Act, Pub L No 67-5, ch 8, 42 Stat 5 (1921)
(specifying quotas for immigrants based on national origin but also giving preference to certain
relatives of US residents, including spouses and unmarried minor children). See also John
Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 310-11 (Atheneum
1963). This system was in place from 1921 until 1965.
99 Pub L No 89-236,79 Stat 911, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
100 See Hart-Celler Act § 1, 79 Stat at 911.
101 See Marc R. Rosenblum, US Immigration Reform: Can the System Be Repaired? *4
(UC San Diego, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper No 132, Jan
2006), online at http://ccis.ucsd.edulwp-content/uploads/201207/wrkgl32.pdf (visited Nov 25,
2012).
102 See Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 18 table 6
(DHS Aug 2011), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois-yb
_2010.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012).
103 See 8 USC § 1153. For a description of these categories and formulas by the Department of State, see Bureau of Consular Affairs, Family-Based Immigrant Visas (Department of
State 2012), online at http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types-1306.html (visited Nov
25,2012).
104 8 USC § 1153(a).
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circumstances) parents. '" LPRs, on the other hand, are subject to quota restrictions even for these immediate family members.'" Second, citizens have larger allocations under the quotas for relatives who are not
immediate family members. Therefore, citizens have an easier time
than LPRs bringing in siblings, parents, and adult children.
Relatives who may be sponsored by citizens or LPRs include
spouses, both minor and adult children, parents, and siblings."n Before 1965, the little family migration available was limited to spouses
and minor children. Hart-Celler dramatically expanded the types of
family relationships that could serve as the basis for a visa application. Nonetheless, with the exception of those noncitizens who qualify as immediate family members, prospective beneficiaries of familyrelated visas are subject to quotas. The numerical limit applicable for
any particular migrant, which is far too complex to explain in detail,
turns on three principal factors.'" First, it turns on the nature of the
familial relationship, with spouses and children generally receiving
preferential treatment over brothers and sisters. Second, the quota
depends on whether the sponsoring resident is a citizen or LPR; LPRs
currently face a multiyear backlog for spousal and child admissions,
while citizens can bring in spouses and minor children without regard
to the quotas. Third, the quota turns in part on the country from which
the relative is emigrating.'" The employment- and family-based preferences are subject to per-country limits, which place ceilings on the
number of otherwise qualifying migrants who may come from a single
country in any given year. The limit, which is roughly twenty-five
thousand per country, ' has led to backlogs of more than ten years for
some relatives immigrating from Mexico and the Philippines."'

105

An unmarried minor child is excluded from the definition of immediate family if she is

born outside of marriage to a citizen father, but she is not excluded if born to a citizen mother.
See Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 797-800 (1977) (upholding this differential treatment on the basis of
the parent's sex).
106 Compare 8 USC § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (excluding "immediate relatives" of US citizens
from quota limits), with 8 USC § 1153(a)(2) (subjecting even the spouses and children of LPRs
to quota limitations).
107 8 USC §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a)(2).
108 8 USC § 1151(c).
109 Technically it turns on location of birth rather than nationality or place of emigration,
but these typically coincide in practice.
110 8 USC § 1152(a).
111 See Bureau of Consular Affairs, Immigration Numbers for November2012, 9 Visa Bull
50 (US Department of State Nov 2012), online at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/
visabulletin/visabulletinnovember20l2.pdf (visited Nov 25,2012).
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Possible Justifications for Delegating Admissions Authority to
Family Members

Why might a state give citizens (and sometimes LPRs) the option of selecting new immigrants from within the pool of their eligible family members? Unlike labor migration, where the informational advantages of prospective employers are straightforward,
delegation to family members presents a more complicated picture.
Consider three possible reasons why a state might employ a familybased migration system: to respect the significance of family relationships to people's lives and therefore to privilege family reunification as an independent value; to speed the integration of new immigrants; and to promote the migration of people with racial and
cultural characteristics that match the existing polity.
Each of these justifications for the system might help explain
why the state would delegate screening authority to resident family
members. But each also raises important agency issues.
1. Family reunification.
To the extent the state authorizes family migration because of a
desire to permit citizens to live near to those they care about deeply,
delegation provides some information about the closeness of the relationship. In almost all cases, the citizen or LPR must file a visa petition for a family member to receive an immigration benefit. 12' And
in the case of spouses, the US resident obviously must choose to
marry the person for the qualifying relationship to exist. The sponsoring resident has far better information than the government about
how close she is to her relatives. After all, parents and children are
not always close. It might waste limited immigration slots to permit
family members to enter the United States without asking the resident to reveal whether she cares sufficiently about the relationship to
file a petition on the family member's behalf.
Of course, if respecting close family relationships or intimate relationships more generally is the state's principal concern, the current rules clearly fall short. They define qualifying family relationships in a way that privileges mainstream cultural understanding of
family. "3 They are also biased against those whose most significant
See note 104 and accompanying text.
This is an observation about marriage rules frequently made outside the immigration
context. See, for example, Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Refraining the Legal Understandingof Caregiving and Caregivers,94 Va L Rev 385, 437-54 (2008) (discussing how the
"norms attendant to the institution of heterosexual marriage" inform family law); Laura A.
Rosenbury, Friendswith Benefits?, 106 Mich L Rev 189, 189-93 (2007) ("[Flamily law's failure
112
113
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relationships are not with family members at all. These shortcomings
could be ameliorated by a broader delegation. Each citizen (or LPR)
could be given a small number of immigration slots and permitted to
sponsor whomever he wished for a visa. But closeness is surely not
the state's only concern. Such a delegation would undercut the
state's ability to use the immigration system to promote traditional
notions of family-a power the state has employed regularly
throughout immigration history.'
Perhaps even more importantly, delegating to existing citizens
the power to pick one or more migrants would exacerbate a serious
agency issue that the current system of family migration already faces. The agency problem is this: in a world where the migration benefit is very valuable, the government's agent may simply sell the benefit. The current system addresses this problem in part by limiting the
scope of prospective migrants who can be sponsored by an existing
citizen or LPR. The number of overseas family members is much
smaller than the total number of noncitizens who might like to purchase a green card. The current system also relies for the most part
on qualifying relationships that cannot be manufactured. Under most
circumstances, one has no control over the identity of one's parents
or siblings. And while citizen children can sponsor their noncitizen
parents for visas, the code prohibits minor children from doing so"'thereby preventing noncitizens from coming to the United States and
giving birth to a citizen in order to acquire an immediate immigration benefit for themselves.
Nonetheless, there is one qualifying relationship that is voluntary:
the relationship of spouses. This raises a serious concern that citizens
will sell immigration benefits by entering into sham marriages.
Historically, the government tried to police this behavior by monitoring marriage choices directly, inquiring into whether a marriage is
"real" or instead fraudulent. The spousal-immigration rules did this
principally by relying on ex ante screening- that is, by attempting to
identify fraudulent marriages only at the point of admission, when the
to recognize friendship impedes existing attempts to achieve gender equality through the elimination of state-supported gender role expectations").
114 Examples include the policing of marriage practices among Chinese immigrants during
the nineteenth century, the differential treatment of mothers' and fathers' relationships with
their children, and the exclusion of same-sex couples in recent years. See Stanford M. Lyman,
Marriage and the Family among Chinese Immigrants to America, 1850-1960, 29 Phylon 321, 324
& n 13 (1968); Fiallo, 430 US at 797-800 (upholding differential treatment on the basis of the
parent's sex). For a discussion of the exclusion of same-sex couples, see notes 130-31 and 15354 and accompanying text.
115 8 USC § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring that children sponsoring their parents "be at least
21 years of age").
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visa would be granted.' 6 Relying on ex ante screening had serious
problems. The government could ask intrusive personal questions to
try to figure out whether the couple had entered into a real marriage
rather than a phony one. But it was easy for couples to dupe the immigration service -as G6rard Depardieu and Andie MacDowell did in
the 1990 movie Green Card-simply by living together briefly and
learning the details of each other's life."7
To combat this problem, the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986"' revised the immigration code to establish a
two-stage screening system for spousal migration."' Today, a newly
married couple cannot get an ordinary green card for the noncitizen
spouse.'2" Instead, the spouse can initially obtain only a "conditional"
LPR visa.'2 ' Unlike other visas conferring LPR status, the conditional
LPR visa expires after two years and is stamped prominently with its
temporary status."'
The conditional status introduces ex post screening into the
spousal-visa process. At the end of the two-year, conditional period,
the spouses must jointly file papers with the federal government in
order to lift the conditional status. l" The filing requires that the couple include information about employment history (like pay stubs),
place of residence, and so forth.'24 They are sometimes also required
to attend a joint interview.'" These steps provide additional information to the government that it can use to determine whether the
marriage is valid -information that would not have been available
for newlyweds at the point when the visa initially was issued.' Rather than rely entirely on an easy-to-game and subjective interview
process, the government can acquire more objective evidence about
whether the couple has cohabited, shared financial obligations, and
otherwise lived the joint life that most married couples live. A couple
See Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 836-37 (cited in note 12).
Green Card (Touchstone Pictures 1990).
118 Pub L No 99-639, 100 Stat 3537, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
119 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments § 2, 100 Stat at 3537-39.
120 See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments § 2, 100 Stat at 3537-38.
121 8 USC § 1186a(a)(1).
122 8 USC § 1186a (describing conditional status); 8 USC § 1227(a)(1)(G) (describing the
two-year review and potential subsequent removal).
123 8 USC § 1186a(c)(1)(A).
124 8 USC § 1186a(d)(1).
125 See 8 USC § 1186a(c)(1)(B). But see 8 USC § 1186a(d)(3) (permitting the Secretary of
Homeland Security to waive the interview requirement).
126 In addition, if the couple does not follow these requirements, the sponsored spouse's
visa will expire, and the prominent stamp will make it difficult for the noncitizen to continue to
live in the United States without detection. See 8 USC § 1186a(c)(1)-(2). It is harder, therefore, for the couple to avoid this second stage of screening.
116
117
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in a sham marriage can, of course, also live a joint life for this twoyear period in order to pass the ex post screen, but it is much more
costly for them to do so than for a legitimately married couple. Thus,
the new system imposes relatively lower costs on valid marriages
than on fraudulent marriages
and, in theory, can help align the incen21 7
citizen-agents.
the
of
tives
The development of the marriage fraud rules highlights the fact
that there will often be two ways that the government might try to
reduce principal-agent slack when it delegates immigration authority. It can directly monitor the agent's performance. This will often be
difficult, however, because the private information that justifies delegating to the agent in the first place also makes it difficult for the
government to evaluate the agent's performance. Therefore, the
government will often be more successful if it can structure immigration law to create incentive-compatible contracts for its agentscontracts that provide greater rewards to the agent, or are less costly
to comply with, when the agent acts consistently with the government's interests. The evolution of the spousal-immigration rules reflects a move away from the first strategy and toward the second.
2. Integration and social externalities.
Family-based migration can also be seen as a way of promoting
integration among recent arrivals. To be sure, there are many ways a
state might use its admissions system to promote integration. Many
states -particularly states with relatively homogenous racial or ethnic compositions -have historically used the race or ethnicity of entering migrants as a proxy for their assimilability.1s Beyond the fact
that many believe race-based immigration criteria to be morally repugnant, such an approach has obvious practical limitations in diverse countries such as the United States. Family-based admissions
127

The sponsor's continuing control over the immigrant's lawful status in the country

does give the sponsor significant control over the immigrant. In the employment context this
raised the possibility that employers would exploit immigrants who lacked visa portability. In
the marriage context this raises concerns about exploitation or abuse by the sponsoring spouse.
To ameliorate this problem, the immigration code includes a limited exception to the joint petition requirement. See 8 USC § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (providing an exception if the marriage was
"entered into in good faith," but has been terminated "and the alien was not at fault," in failing
to meet the joint interview requirement). The immigration code also includes a special visa
category for those who are the victims of abuse at the hands of their sponsoring spouses. See 8
USC § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (providing the "Hardship waiver" requirements).
128 See Eytan Meyers, Theories of International Immigration Policy-A Comparative
Analysis, 34 Intl Migration Rev 1245, 1251-57 (2000) (examining immigration systems in different countries, including an analysis of the "national identity" approach to immigration employed by homogenous countries such as Japan and Germany).
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may do considerably better than this crude proxy. For as we have
explained elsewhere, immigrants may be able to integrate more
quickly and easily if they have existing family in the receiving state
who can provide social ties, financial support, and valuable information about the immigrant's new home.
On this account, the state can also capitalize on the private information and interests of citizens (and LPRs) by delegating to them
the power to pick immigrants from among their family members. As
we explained above, citizens have better information about whether
they are close to their qualifying relatives. Here that information is
useful because citizens are much more likely to provide support to
immigrating relatives if they feel close to them. Permitting relatives
to apply for family-based visas without a sponsor, therefore, would
undermine the usefulness of the family migration system as a means
of promoting integration. Relatedly, citizens are more likely than the
government to have a good sense of which close family members are
likely to flourish in the United States. Since these citizens are also
likely to take to heart the interests of these family members, they
may be unlikely to encourage a family member to migrate if it is likely that person would be miserable in the United States and would
become dependent on her US relatives for financial support. Indeed,
citizens would likely encourage foreign relatives to immigrate to the
United States precisely when they expect their relatives to prosper
and be able to contribute financially and in other ways to the family
in the United States.
But there are two shortcomings with this approach. For one
thing, a citizen can pick only from among his own qualifying relatives. Even if he will do a better job than the government of picking
successful immigrants from among those relatives, there is no reason
to believe he will have a better sense of whether his own family
members will be better bets than other citizens' family members or
other prospective migrants who have no family members in the
United States.
An even more serious problem is that, like employers, resident
family members might ignore some migration costs about which the
government cares deeply. While a citizen may discourage her brother from immigrating if she thinks he will be miserable, her private
calculation about his happiness may ignore various public values the
state wishes to promote. For example, the state may want to pick migrants who already know English or will quickly learn it. But the sister may not worry about whether her brother is likely to learn English if she thinks that he will be able to get along fine while still
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speaking only his native language. Or, more generally, the state may
worry about the fiscal burden the migrant could impose down the
road if he ends up not being successful in the labor market. His sister
might discount this risk more than the state because she will not bear
the cost herself.
To ameliorate these problems, the state might simply take some
discretion away from existing residents by putting additional restrictions on which family members they can sponsor. For example,
the state could require that qualifying family members pass a language test before receiving a visa.'29 Or the state could prohibit a citizen from sponsoring his spouse if their marriage did not conform to
certain norms regarding sex equality or sexuality. The INA does not
impose the former restriction on family reunification, but it does impose the latter. Spouses in plural marriages cannot obtain a spousal
visa.'" Same-sex couples have also historically been prohibited from
qualifying for such a visa. 3' Other countries have been even more aggressive about policing the private choices of citizens related to family reunification. Consider, for example, Denmark's recent changes to
its family-reunification rules for spouses. Denmark has long permitted citizens to bring their spouses into the country. Several years ago
it imposed a new restriction on these visas-making them unavailable if one of the marriage partners is under twenty-four years of
age. 3 The restriction on qualifying marriages was designed to prohibit family reunification on the basis of arranged marriages among
young, religious migrants-who the state feared were likely to be
Arab and Muslim-and thereby discourage such marriages. 3 Worried that residents' private family-reunification decisions would be
129 For examples of systems taking account of language ability in the context of employment-based immigration, see CIC, Six Selection Factors (cited in note 10); Immigration New
Zealand, Skilled Migrant Category Points Indicator (cited in note 67).
130 See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage:Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World without DOMA, 16 Wm & Mary J Women & L 537,
583-86 (2010) (describing the general invalidity of plural marriages under immigration law in
the United States).
131 See Adams v Howerton, 673 F2d 1036, 1038-41 (9th Cir 1982) (denying marriage status
to a same-sex couple under the immigration code because it is "unlikely that Congress intended to give homosexual spouses preferential admission treatment under [one section] of the Act
when, in the very same amendments adding that section, it mandated their exclusion").
132 See Helena Skyt Nielsen, Nina Smith, and Aycan (elikaksoy, The Effect of Marriage
on Education of Immigrants: Evidence from a Policy Reform Restricting Marriage Migration,
111 Scandinavian J Econ 457, 462 (2009).
133 See id at 462 (describing the dual purposes of "the 24-year reform": to reduce the
number of arranged marriages and to "reduce the number of non-Western immigrants entering
the country due to family reunifications"); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U Pa L Rev 341, 363 n 76 (2008).
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insensitive to public values-in Denmark's case, the state's concern
about the development of a large, homogenous bloc of religious
Muslim migrants-the state removed some discretion from its citizen
agents.
Rather than limiting discretion, the state might also try to force
the petitioning family member to internalize the public values that
matter to the state. For instance, if the government is worried about
the potential future fiscal burden of a new migrant, it could require
the petitioning party to bear some of the costs if the immigrant ends
up being unable to support herself. The INA does something like
this, requiring sponsoring relatives to pledge to financially support
the relatives they are sponsoring.'" One difficulty with this approach
is that it may be difficult to enforce such pledges after the fact.'35 And
even if the pledges are enforceable, financial stability is a rather
crude measure of integration or other values about which the state
cares- especially in family migration contexts, where the decision to
admit is less directly connected to the labor market and to the fiscal
issues that underlie the employment visa allocations. Thus, in practice it may be quite difficult to bring the sponsor's incentives in line
with the state's.
3.

Racial homogeneity.

The goal of racial homogeneity does not fit neatly into our informational account of the modern family admissions system. If the
state's goal is to admit migrants of particular races, the state does not
face a significant information problem. Race is conventionally considered a highly visible characteristic. Therefore, the state can regulate the racial composition of the migrant pool by picking races explicitly, as the United States did in the Chinese Exclusion Act.'36 Or it
can do so using proxies like nationality, as the United States did for

134 8 USC § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii) (stating that family-sponsored immigrants are inadmissible
unless an affidavit of support by the sponsor has been submitted); 8 USC § 1183a (describing
the required affidavit of support).
135 See Charles Wheeler, The Affidavit of Support and Sponsorship Requirements: A Critical Analysis, 98 Immig Briefings 1, 6-8 (June 1998) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing the
affidavit of financial support); Robert A. Mautino, Comment, Sponsor Liability for Alien Immigrants: The Affidavit of Support in Light of Recent Developments, 7 San Diego L Rev 314,
314-23 (1970) (discussing the uncertainty of the legal enforceability of the affidavit of financial
support).
136 Ch 126, 22 Stat 58 (1882). The Act excluded all Chinese laborers and defined "Chinese" as a racial category rather than a nationality. Thus, the law covered a person of Chinese
descent born in Peru in the same way it covered a person born in, and immigrating from,
Shanghai.
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many years in the national origin quota system.'37 There is no obvious
informational advantage to delegating the screening decision to
family members or other agents.
Still, it is often said that the creation of the modern system of family reunification in the United States was motivated in part by a desire
to promote the migration of people with racial and cultural characteristics that match the existing polity. From 1921 to 1965, American immigration law regulated the racial and cultural composition of the migrant pool relatively directly through the national origins quota
system." When pressure finally led Congress to abolish the national
origin quota system in 1965, many legislators supported the modem
family-reunification rules because they believed those rules would
largely replicate the results of the quota system.'" The familyreunification system would replace a centralized allocation system
with a delegation to multiple agents. But because these agents were
thought to be likely to pick family members who shared their own racial, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds, the composition of the migrant
pool would not change significantly.
On this account, delegation appears to be driven by a desire to
obfuscate the effects of the admissions rules. The idea is that the
public will not understand the consequences of delegating to family
members or, if they do eventually realize that the system replicates
the racial composition of the existing polity, will not hold legislators
responsible for that result. In the congressional context, obfuscation
and blame shifting is a frequent explanation for agency delegations.' '
The same logic appears to be at work here-though whether the
public was actually duped is another question.

137 See Higham, Strangers in the Land at 310-11 (cited in note 98) (describing the US nationality quota system implemented in 1921).
138 This system allocated immigration slots to each country on the basis of the number of
people from that country who lived in the United States in 1910. See The Emergency Quota
Act § 2, 42 Stat at 5 (limiting immigration "to 3 per centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910"). See also Higham, Strangers in the Land at 310-11 (cited in note 98) (reporting
that the quotas were designed deliberately to try to fix the ethnic composition of the United
States as it existed during the first decade of the twentieth century).
139 See, for example, Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the
Fashioning of America 324-36 (Harvard 2006); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution
Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75
NC L Rev 273, 297-317 (1996) (examining the history surrounding the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965).
140 See generally David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers (Cambridge 1999).
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C. Multiple Agents, Collective Action, and Path Dependency
While we have focused so far on the information and incentives

of individual sponsoring family members, a central feature of the family migration rules is that they delegate immigration authority to a
large number of potential sponsors. As with the labor migration rules,
this feature significantly changes the consequences of the delegation.
Consider the idea that the family-reunification system was designed to replicate the national origins quotas- delegating to multiple agents who would pick new migrants who shared their racial and
cultural backgrounds. While this idea appears to have motivated
some legislators who voted for the system, things did not work out as
these legislators had hoped. Today, petitions for family-based immigration are dominated by persons of Asian and Latin American descent-a quite different mix of migrants than would have been selected under the old national origin quotas.'' Understanding how the

family migration rules might have contributed to this state of affairs
helps highlight the way in which the structure of delegation embed-

ded in the family-based immigration rules-where the state gives
limited admissions authority to a large number of agents-can pro-

mote or undermine the goal of admitting an ethnically or culturally
diverse set of migrants.' 2
A rule permitting a state's existing residents to petition for the

admission of their family members contains an implicit feedback
mechanism. Foreign-born residents are much more likely than native-born citizens to have family abroad. They are also more likely

than native-born citizens to marry noncitizens (many of whom will
be either living abroad or living in the United States without a green
141 In 1960, the flow of LPRs was made up predominantly of Europeans: 75 percent of
new green card recipients were from Europe, 9 percent were from Latin America, and 5 percent were from Asia. In 2010, 53 percent were from Latin America, 28 percent from Asia, and
only 12 percent from Europe. Compare US Census Bureau, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000 11 figure 2.2 (Department of Commerce Dec 2001), online at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012) (providing the breakdown of immigrants by country of national origin over time), with US Census Bureau, The
Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010 2 table 2 (Department of Commerce May
2012), online at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012).
142 As we have explained in other work, there are plenty of reasons why a state might have
preferences about the aggregate composition of the pool of arriving immigrants. For example,
promoting heterogeneity in the migrant pool might facilitate integration and reduce the likelihood that the migration results in the large-scale social exclusion of an identifiable racial group.
While diversity may also come with costs-which explains, in part, the longstanding debates
about the virtues and vices of heterogeneous versus homogenous polities-for present purposes
we remain agnostic about that question. Instead, we are interested in how the disaggregated structure of family admissions influences the composition of the pool of arriving immigrants. See Cox
and Posner, 84 NYU L Rev at 1438 (cited in note 12).
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card).' 3 Consequently, family-reunification rules delegate admission
authority to multiple agents, but the agents are principally foreignborn residents.
In short, the migrants who enter in period one become a large
faction of the people to whom power is delegated in period two.'" This
creates a path dependency in the structure of delegation. The path dependency would be strongest if family connections were the only basis
for entry-for then all of the migrants entering in period one would
have been admitted by the family-reunification rule. But even if there
remain other bases for admission, such as labor visas, the large fraction of migrants admitted to the United States because of family connections ensures that the feedback mechanism is significant.
The fact that early migrants get to pick later migrants does not
itself determine the diversity effect of the delegation. Whether this
feedback mechanism results in a diverse set of agents depends significantly on the composition of the migrant pool in the early periods. If
the migrants admitted in the first period after the rule's introduction
are diverse, their admission will make it more likely that the pool of
later migrants is also diverse. But if a homogenous pool of migrants
is admitted in the early periods, it becomes increasingly unlikely that
the migrants admitted in the future under the system will compose a
diverse pool.
This makes the system quite sensitive to shocks during the early
periods. If migration during the early period is quite diverse, the system is likely to converge to one that selects a diverse pool of migrants over time (so long as a period-one migrant is likely to pick a
period-two migrant similar to herself along whatever dimension we
are evaluating diversity). If migration during the early period happens to include a more homogenous group of migrants, the system is
likely to replicate that homogeneity over time. In the United States,
it appears that just such an early period shock to the composition of
the migrant pool is in part responsible for long-term, persistent
changes to the demographic effects of the family migration system.
143 See US Census Bureau, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population at 33 (cited in note
141) (providing native- and foreign-born intermarriage statistics); Sharon M. Lee and Barry
Edmonston, New Marriages,New Families: U.S. Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage,60 Population Bull 1, 16-17 (Population Reference Bureau June 2005), online at http://www.prb.org/
pdf05/60.2newmarriages.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012); Matthijs Kalmijn, Intermarriageand Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, Trends, 24 Ann Rev Sociology 395,410 (1998).
144 There is a related general feedback loop inherent in all immigration systems, where
today's migrants become tomorrow's citizens and voters who will control the future content of
immigration law. The mechanism we describe here is different because it is driven by the current immigration rules, rather than by the possibility that immigration law will change in the
future because of the political preferences of current migrants.

20121

Delegationin Immigration Law

1329

The years immediately following the adoption of the family quota

system saw an unanticipated surge of migrants from Latin America
and Asia.' 5 The reason for the surge is not fully understood. But
whatever its causes, it created a large pool of recent migrants, many
of whom had overseas family members they wished to sponsor for

visas under the new system. This set in motion a path dependent process whose effects are still felt more than four decades later. As with

labor migration, this highlights the importance of paying close attention to the disaggregated structure of delegation in immigration law.
IV. US STATES

Recent events have reinvigorated longstanding debates about
the role of states in American immigration law. Arizona, Georgia,
Alabama, and other states frustrated by the failure of federal immi-

gration reform have passed their own statutes related to immigration
enforcement.'" In an unusual move, the federal government sued Ar-

izona, arguing that the state has no authority to legislate in an arena
traditionally reserved to the federal government.47' The Supreme
Court vindicated the federal government's position, striking down
the core features of Arizona's law.
The controversy in Arizona might be taken as evidence that the
federal government does not want state and local governments involved in immigration enforcement. But the opposite is true. In recent years the federal government has increasingly delegated authority to states to screen immigrants. And this delegation is nothing
new. Since the birth of modern immigration law in the 1880s, the
federal government has often allowed state and local officials to decide which noncitizens could enter and remain in the United States.'"
145 See US Census Bureau, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population at 11 (cited in note
141) (providing the breakdown of immigrants by country of national origin over time).
146 See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070), 2010 Ariz
Sess Laws 113, as amended by HB 2162, 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 211; Beason-Hammon Alabama
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (HB 56), 2011 Ala Act 535; Illegal Immigration Reform
and Enforcement Act of 2011 (HB 87), 2011 Ga Laws 252; SB 20, 2011 SC Acts & Resol 69;
Pub L No 171-2011, 2011 Ind Acts 590; Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act (HB 497),
2011 Utah Laws 21. See also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, NY Times Al (Apr 24, 2010) (discussing Arizona SB 1070 and similar statutes in other
states); Editorial, D.L Y. ImmigrationReform, NY Times WK9 (Mar 20, 2011) (discussing Utah
HB 497 and the trend of states passing immigration reform statutes).
147 See generally Arizona v United States, 132 S Ct 2492 (2012). Federal courts have enjoined the implementation of portions of the recent state enactments. See id at 2497-98; Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v Governor of Georgia, 691 F3d 1250, 1269 (11th Cir
2012).
148 See Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of
Modern ImmigrationLaw 247-48 (North Carolina 1995); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:
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The delegation to state and local officials looks significantly different, however, than the forms of delegation discussed in the preceding Parts. Employers and family members are mostly delegated
ex ante screening authority-the discretion to pick migrants at the
front end of the system. In contrast, the discretion delegated to state
and local officials is almost exclusively ex post screening authority.
This Part describes the ways in which immigration law delegates to
state and local officials partial authority to pick, from a large pool of
potentially deportable noncitizens, those who will ultimately be deported. It then turns to consider the informational advantages of
states that might justify such delegation and considers the agency
costs of incorporating state and local officials into the immigrant
screening system.
A. The Screening Authority of State and Local Officials
To understand the delegation of screening authority to states, it
is important to distinguish local variation from delegation. Immigration law frequently relies on local conditions to determine whether a
particular noncitizen should be admitted or deported. Consider three
prominent examples:
(1) Federal immigration law explicitly makes variation in local
labor market conditions a valid reason to accept or reject a particular migrant's application for a labor visa. To qualify for a visa, an applicant's sponsoring employer must show that it has
performed a search and is unable to locate another American
worker to fill the position. The search is often local, rather than
national, in scope. As we explained in Part II.E.5, the assumption
is that immigrant workers can be absorbed without cost to areas
that face labor shortages, but will drive down the wages of existing workers if they immigrate to areas without any shortage."9
The Rise of State and Local Power of Immigration, 86 NC L Rev 1557, 1569-71, 1593-96

(2008).
149

Relatedly, local labor market conditions are sometimes the basis for the creation of

targeted admissions programs. For example, purported shortages of sugar cane cutters in central Florida were part of what motivated the creation of the H-2A guest worker program in

1986. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 §§ 301-03, Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat
3359, 3411-31; Judith Adler Hellman, Migration in the Americas: Permanent, Cyclical, Temporary, and Forced, 46 Latin Am Rsrch Rev 235, 243 (Apr 2011). While technically a program of

general applicability, nearly all H-2A workers have been sponsored by employers in just a
handful of states along the southeastern seaboard. See Immigrant Workers in US Agriculture:
The Role of Labor Brokers in Vulnerability to Forced Labor 15-17 (Verit6 June 2010), online

at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2174&context=globaldocs
(visited Nov 25, 2012).
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(2) The INA permits citizens and lawful permanent residents to
sponsor their spouses for green cards. ' But to determine who
counts as a "spouse" for purposes of this valuable federal immigration benefit, the code relies on state family law. Under existing law, a person can be a spouse only if the couple is validly
married according to both the law of the state in which the marriage was performed and the law of the state in which they reside (or intend to reside, if the spouse is coming from overseas).' Thus, variations in state marriage law can affect a
noncitizen's eligibility for a visa. Historically, this reliance on
state law mattered most in instances where states differed over
the age of consent or the marriage of related persons."' Today,
however, the most significant difference between state marriage
laws concerns same-sex marriage. While these differences have
until recently been unimportant because federal law prohibited
same-sex couples from receiving any federal benefit on the basis
of their marriage, ' the Obama administration has recently announced that it believes the federal prohibition is unconstitutional."' For a same-sex couple, therefore, the availability of a
150 8 USC §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a)(2). As we explained above, a citizen's spouse is
treated more favorably than almost any other immigrant; she is eligible for admission as an
LPR solely on the basis of her marriage to an American citizen, and her visa application is exempt from the complex quotas that apply to the vast majority of migrants who enter the United States under other admission rules. A spouse of an LPR is subject to the quota system for
family migration, but she too becomes eligible for a green card by virtue of her marriage.
151 See Matterof Darwish, 14 I&N Dec 307, 307-08 (BIA 1973).
152 See Matterof Zappia, 12 I&N Dec 439, 440-42 (BIA 1967).
'53 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) § 3, Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419, 2419 (1996),
codified at 1 USC § 7 (defining-under federal law-"marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife," and "spouse" as only "a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife").
154 See Eric H. Holder Jr, Attorney General, Letter to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the
US House of Representatives, Defense of Marriage Act (Feb 23, 2011), online at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (visited Nov 25, 2012) (announcing the President's decision "that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ...as applied to
same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment" and his instruction to the Department of Justice (DOJ) not
to defend the statute in pending litigation). Prior to the decision of the Obama administration
to decline to defend the constitutionality of DOMA, a same-sex couple that married in one of
the states permitting such marriages was barred from obtaining an immigration benefit by
DOMA. In the wake of the decision not to defend the statute, however, the state of DOMA's
enforcement in the immigration context has been changing rapidly. Because the administration
took the position that it would continue to enforce DOMA, even while declining to defend it,
US Citizenship and Immigration Services has refused to accept visa applications filed by samesex couples. See Julia Preston, Confusion over Policy on Married Gay Immigrants, NY Times
A14 (Mar 30, 2011). Nonetheless, the administration has stayed some (though not all) pending
immigration decisions involving claims of spousal-immigration benefits made by same-sex couples. See Julia Preston, Justice Dept. to Continue Policy against Same-Sex Marriage,NY Times
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green card for a noncitizen spouse may soon turn on whether the
state where the couple lives (or wants to live after the noncitizen
spouse immigrates) permits same-sex couples to marry.
(3) The deportability of a resident noncitizen often turns on the
content of state criminal law. For example, a noncitizen becomes deportable if he is convicted of, among other things,
"rape," "murder," or a "crime involving moral turpitude"
(though the latter counts only if committed within five years of
entry). ' Convictions under state law count, but of course different states use the same label to criminalize different conduct.
The crime of rape does not include the same elements in every
state, and in many states the formal category of rape has been
superseded by a broader offense of "sexual assault." Immigration law could provide federal definitions of these crimes and
thereby render differences in state criminal codes irrelevant. Instead, however, immigration judges and federal courts have long
followed an approach-known as the "categorical approach"that makes the decision about criminal deportability turn on the
way these crimes are defined in state criminal law, rather than
just on the conduct of the noncitizen 6
In each of these examples, screening decisions depend on local
conditions. Thus, while immigration law is often described as the archetypical uniform national policy-the federal government often claims
in court that its power to regulate migration comes from Congress's
authority to create a "uniform rule of naturalization""' -immigration
law in practice varies from state to state. Nonetheless, while these
sources of local variation in federal immigration law raise important

A15 (May 9, 2011). These decisions have led some judges to suspend deportation in other cases
involving same-sex couples as well. See Julia Preston, Judge Gives Immigrant in Same-Sex
Marriagea Reprieve from Deportation,NY Times A12 (May 7, 2011). For a general discussion
of the President's decision to enforce but not defend DOMA, see Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But
Not Defending) "Unconstitutional"Laws, 98 Va L Rev 1001, 1021-28 (2012).
155 8 USC § 1227(a)(2) (making noncitizens deportable for, among other crimes, "crimes
involving moral turpitude," "controlled substances" violations, and "aggravated felon[ies]"); 8
USC § 101(a)(43) (defining "aggravated felony" to include, among other things, "murder, rape,
or sexual abuse of a minor").
156 Under a pure categorical approach, the adjudicator does not look to the noncitizen's
conduct at all. It asks instead whether all of the conduct covered by the state criminal statute is
a strict subset of the conduct covered by the federal law's definition of a crime involving moral
turpitude. A noncitizen's deportability will thus hinge on how the state has drafted its criminal
law. See Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The CategoricalApproachfor Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude after Silva-Trevino, 111 Colum L Rev 313, 314 (2011).
157 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4 (emphasis added).
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questions, 8 they do not involve the delegation of significant screening
authority to state and local governments. States play no role in evaluating the local labor market conditions on which the grant of an employment visa depends."' And while states do determine the content of
state criminal and family law, it seems highly unlikely that a state
would manipulate its criminal or family law in order to change the immigration consequences for migrants living in the state.
It might be tempting to conclude, therefore, that the federal
government delegates little screening authority to states. Such a conclusion would be mistaken. In two ways that are centrally important
given the modern structure of immigration law, the federal government gives states considerable discretion to decide which noncitizens
should be selected for deportation.
First, immigration law's heavy reliance on state criminal convictions to decide whom to deport gives states tremendous ex post screening authority. As we noted above, convictions for certain crimes render
noncitizens deportable. But because the fact of conviction and the statute under which a noncitizen is convicted often determine whether immigration consequences attach to criminal conduct, inadmissibility and
deportability frequently turn on a state's arresting, charging, and plea
practices. For example, county prosecutors often have the option of
charging a defendant with at least two offenses, one that will render the
defendant deportable and one that will not." ' And even if the prosecutor charges the defendant with a deportable offense, defense lawyers
negotiating a plea agreement can bargain for a conviction that saves the
defendant from deportation.
If criminal deportations were not an important part of immigration screening, or if there were little room for local prosecutors to
bargain over sentences and offenses, this aspect of immigration law
158 One unexplored question is whether immigration law focuses on the right sorts of local
conditions. Sometimes it seems to get things backwards. For example, immigration law formally
focuses on local labor market conditions in ways that likely underestimate the extent to which the
labor market in the United States is national. At the same time, potentially more significant local
costs are often treated as formally irrelevant by federal immigration law. Many social services,
such as education, are financed predominantly at the state and local level. In theory, therefore, it
might make more sense to take these local costs into account rather than the anticipated labor
market effects. Yet admission and deportation decisions are not formally responsive to the cost of
providing local public goods to immigrants.
159 8 USC § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (providing that an alien seeking entry into the United States to
perform any labor is admissible only if the Secretary of Labor certifies "there are not sufficient
workers who are able, willing, qualified" and "available" in "the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor"); 20 CFR § 656.24 (providing the process for labor certification decisions); Aleinikoff, et al, Immigrationand Citizenship at 362-67 (cited in note 28).
160 See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress's Shadow, 90 Cornell L Rev
1411, 1415, 1422-33 (2005).
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would not delegate much discretion to local agents. But neither of
these things is true. Criminal deportations make up a large and growing fraction of all removals. In 2010, for example, half of all deportations were of noncitizens with criminal convictions."' The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also announced that it will
further prioritize criminal deportations in coming years while deemphasizing other grounds of removal."2 In addition, charge and sentence bargaining is a central-perhaps the single most importantfeature of the American criminal justice system. Criminal law scholarship has long recognized that plea bargaining's dominance, combined with the dramatic expansion of substantive criminal law, delegates vast swaths of discretion to local officials to decide whom to
incarcerate.'" This same discretion makes it relatively easy for local
prosecutors to control a noncitizen's deportability in the pleabargaining process.'

Second, the federal government frequently delegates to states by
asking or requiring them to help screen migrants using the formal
screening criteria contained in the INA. State involvement in enforcement dates back all the way to the first large-scale immigration restrictions adopted by the federal government-the Chinese Exclusion
161 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) statistics report 387,242 deportations in
2010; 168,532 are described as being of "convicted criminals." Office of Immigration Statistics,
Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010 1, 4 (DHS June 2011), online at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012).
162 See John Morton, Director of ICE, Memorandum for All Field Office Directors, All
Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Prioritiesof the Agency for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens (July 17, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012) (instructing immigration customs officials with prosecutorial discretion to pay particular attention to factors
such as lengthy criminal records, gang participation, immigration fraud, and general threats to
national security); Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Hearing before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 199, 207 (Dec 9, 2009) (testimony of
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, DHS).
163 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Harvard
2010).
164 While systematic evidence that local prosecutors bargain in order to shape deportation
consequences is hard to come by, anecdotal evidence abounds. For example, there is evidence
that some local prosecutors are adopting policies designed to mitigate the immigration consequences of criminal prosecution. See, for example, Jeff Rosen, District Attorney of Santa Clara
County, Memorandum to Fellow Prosecutors, Collateral Consequences (Sept 14, 2011), online
at http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/unit_7b_4_santa-clara-da-policy.pdf (visited Nov 25,
2012) (describing policy to bargain with criminal defendants to avoid immigration collateral
consequences where the collateral consequence is significantly greater than the punishment for
the crime itself); Editorial, Track Results of the County's New ICE Policy, San Jose Mercury
News 10A (Oct 27, 2011) ("Rosen ... implemented an enlightened policy in his office to consider whether a plea bargain might trigger deportation, which would be a disproportionate
punishment for some crimes.").
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Act of 1882. When this Act was passed, no federal immigration bureaucracy existed to enforce the law. So Congress turned to local officials. These officials, working in San Francisco and other ports of
entry, would interview arriving migrants to determine whether they
were subject to exclusion. While federal power was not entirely absent from this process-for example, immigrants whose admission
was denied could file a habeas petition in federal court-local officials were frequently frontline enforcers during this early period."M
As the federal bureaucracy expanded, the role of states shrank.
But over the past few decades, the federal government has increasingly turned again to states as enforcement agents. The paradigmatic
modern example is the enforcement authority delegated pursuant to
§ 287(g) of the immigration code. Enacted as a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996M
(IIRIRA), § 287(g) authorizes the attorney general to enter into
agreements with states and local governments to enforce immigration law."' Today there are nearly one hundred such agreements, and
they authorize two principal types of enforcement activity. The majority of the agreements embody a jail screening model: these
agreements, such as the one Los Angeles County entered into in
2005, authorize local officials to screen arrestees for immigration violations when they are booked into jail and then issue detainers
against suspected violators.' " A minority of agreements authorize local officials to screen for status and issue detainers during ordinary
policing operations-a street-level enforcement model.
Complementing § 287(g) is DHS's new Secure Communities initiative."9 Secure Communities is an information-sharing initiative
rolled out in 2008.' Traditionally, whenever a person is arrested and
165
166
167

See Salyer, Law Harsh as Tigers at 247-48 (cited in note 148).
Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009, 3009-546.
IIRIRA § 133, 110 Stat at 3009-546 to -563, enacting INA § 287(g), codified at 8 USC

§ 1357(g).
168 See, for example, Lance Pugmire, Immigration Check at Inland Jail Is Okd, LA Times
B3 (Sept 21, 2005) (discussing agreements between federal immigration officials and Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties allowing local law enforcement officials to screen for illegal

immigrants).
169 For a full description of the program, see ICE, Secure Communities (DHS 2012),
online at http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (visited Nov 25, 2012).
170 SCOMM is both a successor and a complement to the Criminal Alien Program (CAP),
which has been in place since 1991. See Lisa M. Seghetti, Karma Ester, and Michael John Garcia, Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement 2 (Congresonline
at http://www.au.af.miVau/
2009),
Mar
11,
Service
sional Research
awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012). Under CAP, federal immigration agents
engaged in jail screening in a number of local jurisdictions around the country. See id; ICE,
CriminalAlien Program(DHS 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (visited
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booked by a state or local law enforcement agency, his fingerprints
are taken and forwarded electronically to the FBI. The FBI compares those prints against various national criminal information databases that return a "hit" if the person has a criminal history or outstanding warrants. Under Secure Communities, the federal
government forwards to DHS the fingerprints already being routed
to the FBI; DHS then compares the person's fingerprints against a
database designed to identify persons who have outstanding immigration violations, such as persons who are unlawfully in the country
because they have overstayed their visas, or because they have been
previously deported and have not been legally readmitted."' If the
database identifies an arrestee as a potential immigration violator,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) notifies the local law
enforcement agency and may place a detainer on the person.172 The
detainer requests that the local agency hold the person for fortyeight hours in order to permit ICE to transfer the person to federal
custody for the initiation of deportation proceedings."3 Secure Communities has already been rolled out in more than 3,000 local jurisdictions,174 and is projected to reach nationwide coverage by the end
of 2012.17' It therefore covers a much7 broader swath of the country
than do existing § 287(g) agreements. 1
The local discretion embodied in cooperative federalism arrangements like Secure Communities and § 287(g) stems from two
facts: First, local police have tremendous arrest discretionparticularly with respect to minor offenses, such as disorderly conduct,

Nov 25, 2012). Because the program is much more labor intensive than SCOMM, it has had
considerably more limited scope than does SCOMM.
171 See ICE, Secure Communities (cited in note 169).
172 See id.
173 See ICE, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action (DHS Dec 2011), online at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (visited Nov
25, 2012) (providing a copy of the detainer form). See also 8 CFR § 287.7.
174 See ICE, Activated Jurisdictions(DHS Aug 22, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/secure-communities/pdflsc-activated.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012) (providing current
SCOMM participation).
175 See ICE, Planned Nationwide Usage of the Biometric Information Sharing Capability
by Fiscal Year (2009-2013) *1 (DHS), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/sc-dep.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012) (providing SCOMM nationwide usage, projected through 2013). Some states, however, have attempted to withdraw from SCOMM. See
Peter H. Schuck, Three States Short of a Secure Community, NY Times A27 (June 23, 2011)
(discussing the attempted withdraw of New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois from SCOMM).
176 For an explanation of the way in which Secure Communities represents a dramatic
expansion of prior programs, see Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, PolicingImmigration, 80
U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2013).
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traffic offenses, and the like.' Second, there are about eleven million

unauthorized migrants living in the United States today. 7 The federal government does not have the capacity or the desire to remove all

of these persons who are present in the US in violation of immigration law. For that reason, the act of choosing which among those
eleven million to deport effectively determines the substance of the
nation's ex post immigrant screening system."9 By using local arrests
as the trigger for screening, programs like Secure Communities lodge
authority to initiate screening in the hands of local officials. And this
discretionary authority is growing. Secure Communities is still being
activated, but in Fiscal Year 2010 the program accounted for over 10
percent of all deportations, and in Fiscal Year 2011 the program accounted for almost 20 percent.'
B.

The Advantages of Delegating to States

State and local officials have informational advantages over the
federal government on two fronts.
1. Identifying acknowledged immigrant violators.
First, states often have more information about the identity and
location of potentially deportable noncitizens."' For the federal government, locating removable noncitizens is one of the biggest obstacles
to deporting them. But states have many more interactions with residents that can serve as opportunities for identifying these individuals.
177 For a classic statement of the breadth of police discretion, see generally Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L J 543 (1960). See also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion
and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum
L Rev 551 (1997).
178 See Visa Waiver ProgramOversight: Risks and Benefits of the Program, Hearingbefore
the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the House Judiciary Committee,
112th Cong, 1st Sess 72, 72-75 (Dec 7, 2011) (testimony of Jessica M. Vaughan, Director of
Policy Studies, Center for Immigration Studies). But see ICE, Secure Communities (cited in
note 169).
179 See Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 836-43 (cited in note 12). See also Cox and
Rodriguez, 119 Yale L J at 519-28 (cited in note 6).
180 Compare ICE, Removal Statistics (DHS), online at http://www.ice.gov/removalstatistics (visited Nov 25, 2012), with ICE, Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc14,
2011), online
(DHS
Oct
Statistics 2
stats/nationwideinteroperability-stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012).
181 We say "potentially deportable" here because states are almost certainly worse than
the federal government at assessing a noncitizen's actual deportability. Deportability turns on
the application of the incredibly complex immigration code, something most local officials
have no training to do. But identifying violations of state criminal law-rendering migrants
potentially deportable-is well within the states' expertise.
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In large part this is because of the central place that criminal enforcement plays in initiating immigration screening today. As we explained above, state criminal convictions often make noncitizens deportable-and states obviously have more information about those
convictions than the federal government does." But even more significant than convictions are arrests. In theory, every arrest leads to
the collection of information about a person's identity. This identification information can be used by the federal government to determine whether the arrestee is living in the United States in violation
of immigration law-because he sneaked across the border, overstayed his visa, or violated some more technical requirement of immigration law."
State and local law enforcement officials make many more arrests than does the federal government. From the federal government's perspective, these encounters are essentially free. The only
cost is the cost of comparing the identification information collected
by the state with information that the federal government has about
immigration violators. Without these encounters federal officials
would have to go out and try to locate immigration violators on their
own, using costly workplace raids, roving patrols along the highways
in border areas, passenger screening by ICE agents on trains and
buses, or other strategies.
Secure Communities and § 287(g) thus both capitalize on a local
informational advantage, but they do so in different ways. Secure
Communities has vastly broader-nearly nationwide-coverage.
Wider participation means more information for the federal government. In another respect, however, Secure Communities ignores
some information local officials might possess. Secure Communities
relies on local officials for an arrestee's identity but not for information about immigration status. The arrestee's status is evaluated
on the basis of a biometric match with a federal database of immigration violators. This will lead to plenty of false negatives, because
many noncitizens who are living in the United States in violation of
See notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
It is possible, of course, that the law could prohibit the collection of such identification
information during stops and arrests. At least in the arrest context, few constraints appear to
exist in practice. We focus on arrests here for that reason -and because SCOMM, which we
discuss below, is an information collection system triggered by an arrest rather than simply by a
stop. See Part IV.D.2.
184 See ICE, Activated Jurisdictions(cited in note 174) (providing current SCOMM participation); ICE, Fact Sheet: Delegation of ImmigrationAuthority; Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act (DHS Oct 16, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/
287g.htm (visited Nov 25, 2012) (providing an up-to-date list of participating entities that have
mutually signed § 287(g) agreements with ICE).
182
183
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immigration law have no fingerprints in the federal database that
would lead to a hit (those who have entered without inspection and
not previously been removed are a good example). In contrast, local
officials screening for status under § 287(g) agreements can base
their screening decisions on other grounds, such as the arrestee's responses to questions about where he was born and how he entered
the country.
2. Assessing immigrant desirability.
Second, like employers and family members, state and local officials may also have better information than the federal government
about an immigrant's desirability. In some cases this will be true even
if the federal government does not want screening decisions to turn on
local conditions. Consider, for example, the possibility that the federal
government wants to remove noncitizens who commit particularly serious crimes. State and local criminal justice systems that interact with
people charged and convicted of crimes will, in general, have far richer
information about the offender than will the federal government. The
federal government can, of course, rely on information generated by
the state criminal justice system to evaluate the seriousness of the
crime-looking at the statute under which the person was convicted,
or at the sentence handed down. But the judge who sentences a defendant will often have a more nuanced sense of the defendant's culpability and other characteristics that bear on the noncitizen's desirability in the eyes of the federal government.'5
Perhaps more important, however, are situations in which the
federal government wants immigrant screening conditions to turn in
part on local conditions. As we explained above, there are already a
185 For most of the twentieth century, immigration law had a procedure reflecting this
fact-a policy known as Judicial Recommendation against Deportation (JRAD). See Immigration Act of 1917 § 19, Pub L No 64-301, ch 29, 39 Stat 874, 889-90, repealed by the Immigration
Act of 1990 § 505, Pub L No 101-649, 104 Stat 4978, 5050; Janvier v United States, 793 F2d 449,
452-56 (2d Cir 1986). JRAD authorized the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions to make a recommendation that a convicted noncitizen not be deported. This power,
which was binding on the executive, was understood to reflect the superior information possessed by the sentencing judge. See, for example, Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent JudicialActions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 Cal L Rev Cir 1, 14-15
(2011) (reasoning that the procedure was preferable because it "allowed the judge in the criminal case, the adjudicator most familiar with the facts, to weigh whether deportation should be
part of the penalty"); Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer,
the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 La Raza L J 31, 39-40 (2010) ("Because the criminal
court judge spent more time on the criminal case and was more familiar with all of the circumstances of the case, the criminal court judge was seen as more knowledgeable about these factors than the immigration court judge.").
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number of ways in which immigration law varies depending on local
conditions. In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that
such local variation is a virtue because migration affects local communities in different ways.' 6 While this scholarship has focused principally on the question whether immigration law should be responsive to local conditions, it should be clear that the relevance of local
conditions also raises the question how a nation might design immigration law to be responsive to these conditions.
To the extent that immigrant desirability turns on local norms or
conditions, state and local governments are likely to have superior
information about those conditions. They may better understand local labor markets, have a better sense of the fiscal burdens immigration places on the provision of local public goods, and so on. From an
informational perspective, this argues in favor of delegating screening
authority to these state and local actors with superior information.
C. Disadvantages of Delegation
The disadvantages of delegation should, by now, be familiar. The
central concern is that state and local officials may have different firstorder preferences about migration than does the federal government.
Of course, in much writing about federalism, this divergence is considered a virtue. Decentralizing power, and giving decisional autonomy
to state or local officials, is considered desirable precisely because it
permits them to pursue first-order goals that are different than (and
sometimes at odds with) those pursued by the federal government.'
Because our focus is on principal-agent problems, however, this Article is concerned only with those situations where the federal government wants to capitalize on the informational advantages of state and
local officials while retaining control over the first-order questions
about how many,, and what types, of noncitizens should be admitted or
removed."

186 See, for example, Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 Mich L Rev 567, 580-90 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U Chi Legal F 57, 59; Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism,29 Conn L Rev 1627, 1635-36 (1997).
187 See, for example, Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a
National Neurosis,41 UCLA L Rev 903,924 (1994) ("In a unitary system, the central authority
will generally have a single goal ... [b]ut true federalism allows governmental sub-units to
choose different goals."); Heather K. Gerken, Forward:Federalism All the Way Down, 124
Harv L Rev 4, 21-44 (2010).
188 For the seminal evaluation of federalism as a form of administrative decentralization,
see Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 910-27 (cited in note 187).
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Within this framework, states are useful only because they can
help the federal government locate noncitizens who fit the federal
government's ultimate first-order criteria. Yet states might use their
authority to skew the federal government's enforcement priorities
because of local preferences regarding migration policy. In other
words, the local agents may have better information, but they may
also be biased. Arizona's concern about current immigration levels
might reflect the fact the state has superior information about the
costs of migration. This was one of the claims made by Texas back in
the days of Plyler v Doe," when it claimed that it needed to exclude
some immigrants (those who lacked status) from the school system
because of the costs they imposed on the system.' But Arizona's resistance might also be the product of its citizens' preferences regarding migration. They might simply favor much lower levels of immigration than other voters around the country-perhaps for
ideological reasons, or perhaps because they believe that Arizona
bears the brunt of the costs of US immigration policy without reaping many of the benefits.
One way the federal government might try to ameliorate this
problem is by limiting the states to supplying the federal government
with information regarding local conditions. As with the identification of immigrant violators, this preserves the federal government's
ability to monitor the states. But if the states have superior information, it is far from clear how effective this monitoring can be. In
this respect information about local conditions is different from information about violators: much of the value of that information lies
in the identification of individuals in contexts where the federal government could itself determine deportability. Monitoring in that context may be relatively easier for the federal government.
A second strategy is to rely on behavior by states that provides information about local conditions but is inelastic to the states' preferences about immigration law. Relying on such behavior makes it much

more difficult for the state agents to misrepresent local conditions in order to bias immigration policy toward their state's preferences. For example, if the federal government wants immigration benefits for family members to turn on state understandings of who counts as family,
then relying on state family law may be a relatively good way of getting information about local norms regarding family structure without
457 US 202 (1982).
190 Id at 229 (plurality) (noting Texas's argument "that undocumented children are appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on [its] ability
to provide high-quality public education").
189
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the risk of the state rigging that information because it was especially
pro- or anti-immigrant. It is unlikely that a state will rewrite its family
law just to increase or decrease deportations.
D. The Structure of Delegation to the States
1. Ex ante versus ex post screening.
Perhaps the most important feature of the states' delegated immigration authority is how it differs from the authority given to families and employers. The authority is almost exclusively ex ante for
families, and it is predominantly so for employers. But as the above
discussion demonstrates, state discretion resides at the back end of
the system."'
This structure could contribute to some of the pathologies we
see today. For example, because ex ante and ex post screening
mechanisms are substitutes, denying states any ex ante screening authority might lead them to augment their ex post screening efforts, as
we see in Arizona, Alabama, and elsewhere.
Moreover, the system could in theory be structured differently.
If states have better information about local labor markets, or about
the cost of providing local public goods to migrants, the government
could delegate them ex ante screening authority more akin to that
given to employers and families. States could be given some authority to hand out employment visas, or even given a fixed number of
entry visas to distribute as the state saw fit. Some other countries, including Canada, have experimented with similar approaches," and
Peter Schuck made a similar proposal a few years back. 93
The obvious problem with this approach is that immigrants might
cross state borders if entry visas are not restricted to a particular
state.'"' This is another version of the multiple-agents problem encountered with employers and families.' It is also a problem familiar in the
large literature on regulatory federalism. The general concern in that
literature is that states will compete with each other in socially undesirable ways, impose externalities on one another, and so on.'9'
191 See Part IV.A.

192See Kevin Tessier, Immigration and the Crisis in Federalism:A Comparison of the
United States and Canada,3 Ind J Global Legal Stud 211, 222-23 (1995).
193 See Schuck, 2007 U Chi Legal F at 68-70 (cited in note 186).
194Schuck, who has written widely about the virtues of federalism, overlooks this central
downside. See id.
195 See Parts II.F and IIIC.
196See, for example, Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin, Federalism:PoliticalIdentity
and Tragic Compromise 84-85 (Michigan 2008).
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Here, the problem arises because immigration visas are, at least
in the American system, a grant of authority to reside anywhere in
the United States, not permission to reside in only one state. Moreover, after a noncitizen is admitted, American constitutional law may
prohibit the government from imposing formal restrictions on the
ability of migrants to travel between states.'" Given this, there is a serious concern that internal mobility will undercut the possibility of
immigration law varying in response to local conditions.
One thing to note is that this problem is not unique to immigration law. It is often thought to be-perhaps because immigration law
leads people to focus explicitly on the effects of mobility and exit.
But mobility poses a problem for other forms of regulatory decentralization as well. It is, for example, a longstanding obsession of the
literature on corporate law."
Moreover, immigration law often restricts mobility much more
than it initially appears. It is true that a visa formally provides permission to reside anywhere in the United States. But employment visas often effectively limit an immigrant to working with a single employer. This will often completely control the state in which the
immigrant resides. Consider the various temporary farm worker programs that the United States has employed during the twentieth century. In many of these programs, including the infamous Bracero
program and the modern H-2A program, the immigrant's visa is tied
to a single employer who is bringing the worker to work in a particular place."' The immigrant's admission is temporary, often lasting only a few months, and there is no visa portability. While workers are
not prohibited from crossing state lines, as a practical matter their
temporary admission, fixed place of employment, and lack of visa
portability combine with their working conditions and economic status to effectively limit their stay to one state.
The de facto state-specific nature of at least some labor visas
might make it possible to solve the externalities problem for temporary workers. Perhaps it would be possible even to make these visas
expressly state-specific. But it is inconceivable to imagine this solution
for permanent employment visas because it would be deeply inconsistent with the modem structure of American federalism to have
197See, for example, Saenz v Roe, 526 US 489, 500-07 (1999). Some states, such as China,
do seriously limit internal migration, but no modern democracies formally limit internal mobility. See Delia Davin, InternalMigration in Contemporary China 39-48 (St Martin's 1998).
198 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of CorporateLaw 266 (Harvard 1996).
199 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 127-67 (cited in note 85) (discussing the Bracero program's rules); 8 USC § 1188.
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state-specific citizenship.' Moreover, the United States lacks features
common in other countries-like language segregation across provinces-that can serve as de facto barriers to internal mobility. This is
why the Canadian example relied on by Schuck is largely inapposite. 1
While Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms does protect the internal mobility of citizens and permanent residents, ' Quebec's status
as the nation's sole French-speaking province partially insulates its labor market from the rest of the country. For this reason, Frenchspeaking migrants admitted by Qu6bec pursuant to its delegated authority are less likely to relocate to other provinces, ameliorating the
potential spillovers associated with Quebec's autonomous choices regarding labor migration.
2. Secure Communities and other cooperative enforcement
regimes.
In the absence of ex ante screening authority, cooperative enforcement regimes represent the most significant forms of delegation
to state and local officials. Secure Communities and § 287(g) highlight different institutional approaches to mitigating the agency problems associated with this delegation. From the perspective of the
principal-the federal government-Secure Communities has some
significant advantages over § 287(g) that reduce the risk of both error and bias by the state and local screeners. These advantages may
help explain why the federal government has recently moved aggressively to expand Secure Communities, while § 287(g) is used on a
much more limited basis.
Consider first the risk of error. Section 287(g) arrangements generally require that the agents possess far more expertise than does Secure Communities. Under § 287(g), local officers are deputized to
200 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution: 1863-1877 258
(Harper 1988).
201 CIC, Canada-QuebecAccord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of
Aliens (Feb 5, 1991), online at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/lawspolicy/agreements/
quebec/can-que.asp (visited Nov 25, 2012) ("Qu6bec has sole responsibility for the selection of
immigrants destined to that province and Canada has sole responsibility for the admission of
immigrants to that province."); Regulation Respecting the Selection of Foreign Nationals,
RRQ ch 1-0.2, r 4 (July 6, 2012), online at http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/
dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=3&file=/I 0 2/10 2R4_A.HTM (visited Nov 25, 2012)
(Quebec immigration regulation setting out rules for admission).
202 See
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, c. 6(2), online at
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CH37-4-3-2002E.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012)
("Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of
Canada has the right (a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and (b) to pursue
the gaining of a livelihood in any province.").
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make the initial screening decision, deciding on the basis of their
knowledge of immigration law whether a particular person is a noncitizen who is in violation of immigration law. ' This screening might
take place during an interview in a county jail.2' Or, where local law
enforcement officials have been authorized to make arrests for civil
immigration violations, the screening might take place on the street
or during a traffic stop.2" Because the initial screening decision requires local officers to understand and apply an immigration code
that is notoriously complex, the risk of error arises.
The Justice Department often attempts to reduce the risk of er-

ror through relatively direct supervision: the federal government attempts to draft agreements that specify more precisely what is ex-

pected of local agents, the agents are required to complete training
before engaging in immigration enforcement, and the Justice De-

partment tries to monitor the agents to identify bad behavior.

'

Se-

cure Communities, however, reflects a very different model: the del-

egation to local agents is more constrained, because their role in the
screening process is only to pass identification information about arrestees along to the federal government. This eliminates the need for
local officials to have any knowledge about immigration law. And
one would expect that screening through the federal database,

backed by individual judgment of federal immigration officers who
must decide whether to issue a detainer when the database returns a
hit, would almost certainly produce fewer errors than screening by
local officials with little training and many duties unrelated to immi-

gration enforcement.
Secure Communities also does a better job of preventing local officials from biasing the federal government's enforcement priorities,
particularly among local governments who are inclined to shirk or who

8 USC § 1357(g).
For example, the § 287(g) resolution passed by Prince William County, Virginia in
2007 requires officers to check the residency status of anyone in police custody who they suspect is an illegal immigrant. See Nick Miroff, Pr. William Passes Softened Rules on Illegal Immigration, Wash Post Al (July 11, 2007). See also note 168.
205 For example, the now-revoked § 287(g) implementation in Maricopa County, Arizona,
authorizes officers to check the residency status of anyone pulled over for any traffic violation.
See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona County Uses New Law to Look for Illegal Immigrants, NY
Times A19 (May 10, 2006).
206 See, for example, ICE, Memorandum of Agreement (DHS Oct 2009), online at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r-287gmaricopacou
ntysol02609.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012) (providing the § 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement
signed by Maricopa County). See also Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Settles Lawsuit with Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (DOJ June 2, 2011), online at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/June/11-crt-722.html (visited Nov 25, 2012).
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consider themselves "sanctuary cities."21 ' Secure Communities is different from §287(g) in a way that is central to the agent's discretion: Secure Communities participation is basically mandatory, while § 287(g)
required individual jurisdictions to opt into detailed agreements with
DHS in order to participate." To be clear, there was initially some confusion about whether Secure Communities is formally mandatory, and
some counties and states announced early on that they would not participate in the program." But DHS eventually clarified that the program is indeed mandatory. " And even if it were not, DHS has shifted
the default for participation with tremendous effect. In practice there is
no evidence that jurisdictions have been able to opt out of participation, and ICE is rapidly rolling out the program around the country.
Since its inception in the fall of 2008, DHS has activated all but a handful of counties in the United States, and the agency predicts that it will
activate these remaining counties by the end of 2012."' In contrast, after
fifteen years of existence the § 287(g) program still has fewer than one
hundred participating jurisdictions. 2 Thus, reluctant enforcement
agents cannot easily avoid assisting the federal government with enforcement the way they could under § 287(g).
Even if we focus only on those jurisdictions that do participate,
Secure Communities constrains local discretion more than § 287(g).
Because § 287(g) agreements sometimes give local officials freestanding authority to enforce immigration law, it confers considerable discretion on these officials to decide when and where to target
enforcement resources. Secure Communities, on the other hand, piggybacks on local arrests that, in theory, are already taking place for
other reasons. Thus, it provides fewer opportunities for local officials
with different preferences to bias enforcement priorities.
Fewer opportunities do not mean, of course, no opportunities.
While the federal government would ideally prefer state policing behavior be inelastic to the decision to layer immigration enforcement
on top of criminal enforcement, it cannot ensure that this is true. Local officials still control whether a person is screened by Secure
207 See Seghetti, Ester, and Garcia, Enforcing Immigration Law at 26 (cited in note 170)
(providing a discussion of "sanctuary cities") (quotation marks omitted).
208 See 8 USC § 1357(g).
209 See Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama's Immigration Strategy,
NY Times A18 (May 6, 2011).
210

See note 176.

See ICE, Secure Communities: The Basics (DHS Aug 31, 2012), online at
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities#top (visited Nov 25, 2012).
212 See ICE, Activated Jurisdictions (cited in note 174); ICE, Fact Sheet: Delegation of
ImmigrationAuthority (cited in note 184) (providing an up-to-date list of participating entities
that have signed § 287(g) agreements with ICE).
211
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Communities, because screening requires arrest and local officials
decide whom to arrest. A central question, therefore, is whether state
or local officials will change their local policing behavior in response
to the implementation of Secure Communities in their jurisdictions.
Control over arrest authority appears to provide greater opportunities for local agents who would prefer more immigration enforcement than for those who would prefer less. It is hard to imagine
that the Chicago police would forego arrests in order to prevent persons from being screened through Secure Communities. Yet it is not
terribly difficult for a local government to arrest persons precisely so
that they will be screened. As criminal justice scholars frequently
note, local officials have tremendous arrest discretion."' And the arrest need not lead to a conviction, or even to formal charges, for the
arrestee to be flagged and placed in removal proceedings. Thus, Secure Communities's reliance on arrests as the screening trigger affords local officials more discretion than they would have if the trigger were located at a later point in the criminal process, such as folfollowing a conviction.
While this discussion suggests that Secure Communities may
more effectively discipline sanctuary-city agents than immigrationrestrictionist agents, an asymmetry in the federal government's ability to monitor local agents cuts in the opposite direction. When the
federal government delegates to local agents it often has somewhat
asymmetrical review authority because of the nature of immigration
decisions. In the early days of immigration enforcement, decisions by
local officials to deny admission were subject to federal court review,
because an alien "in custody" by virtue of his denial of admission
could seek habeas review." ' But grants of admission were not subject
to judicial review and as a practical matter were likely subject to essentially no oversight.
Today the situation is reversed. The federal government can decline to initiate proceedings against someone flagged through Secure
Communities."' But decisions by a local cop not to arrest a person pursuant to his § 287(g) authority, or not to arrest a person whom he suspects will be flagged by Secure Communities's database after booking,
or a decision by a local prosecutor to reduce or drop charges that he
knows will make a defendant deportable, are largely unreviewable by
See Goldstein, 69 Yale L J at 543-44 (cited in note 177).
See Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers at 247-48 (cited in note 165) (discussing habeas review with respect to the Chinese Exclusion Act).
215 See ICE, Secure Communities: The Secure Communities Process (DHS Aug 31, 2012),
online at http://www.ice.gov/securecommunities/# (visited Nov 25, 2012).
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federal authorities. And, in practice, some local governments have
begun to adopt similar policies. Both Cook County, Illinois, and Santa Clara County, California, for example, recently announced that
they would decline to comply with requests by the federal government that they hold a person who has been flagged by Secure Communities.216 In this fashion, some shirking by local agents intended to
reduce the level of immigration enforcement is more difficult than
overzealous enforcement behavior for the federal government to
monitor."'

3. Criminal grounds of removal.
In addition to cooperative enforcement, the immigration code's
reliance on state criminal convictions also delegates substantial authority to states. Charging and plea-bargaining practices shape immigration outcomes. In some ways this delegation raises trade-offs that
are similar to those raised by Secure Communities and § 287(g).
There is, however, an important difference: the criminal deportation
rules use a conviction as the trigger for screening, while Secure
Communities relies on arrests.
This difference imposes a potentially more difficult monitoring
problem on the federal government, because it does not have access
to a "true" measure of criminal culpability. Instead, it is forced to rely on the outcome of the plea-bargaining process."' Nonetheless, tying the delegation to convictions can make it costly for the state to
bias its criminal justice outcomes in order to affect immigration policy. Handing down a heftier sentence to ensure deportability means
that the state has to pay to incarcerate the person for a longer period. This is because the INA prohibits the removal of a person before

216 See Policy for Responding to ICE Detainers, Cook County Ordinance § 46-37 (Sept 7,
2011), online at http://library.municode.comfHTML/13805/level4/PTIGEOR_- CH46LAEN
_ARTIISH_DIV1GE.html#PTIGEORCH46LAENARTIISHDIV1GES46-37POREI
CDE (visited Nov 25, 2012); Civil Immigration Detainer Requests, Santa Clara County Board
of Supervisors Policy Manual § 3.54 (Oct 18, 2011), online at http://www.sccgov.org/
sites/bos/Legislation/BOS-Policy-ManuallDocuments/BOSPolicyCHAP3.pdf (visited Nov 25,
2012).
217 For a discussion of this general problem in enforcement regimes, see Dhammika
Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure *28-29 (unpublished working paper, Feb 15, 2011),
online at http://economics.stanford.edu/files/McAdams2_24.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012).
218 This is clearly the case under the categorical approach to evaluating criminal convictions. See note 156 and accompanying text. But even if immigration judges abandoned the categorical approach and tried to suss out the underlying conduct by the noncitizen, they would
typically have little more than the plea- and sentencing-related documents on which to rely.
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the completion of his or her sentence.2 " This restriction on removal
was recently criticized by Schuck, who argued that it should be
changed in order to save on the costs of incarceration.' ° But he misses the fact that these costs may have important disciplining effects on
state and local prosecutors. Without this rule it would be far easier
for state and local prosecutors to skew criminal justice outcomes in
order to affect immigration policy.
CONCLUSION

Canadian-style centralized systems of migrant screening are
popular outside the United States, and to many people they seem
more rational than the American system, which relies heavily on delegated authority to various agents. However, the American system
can be explained as a decentralized system that harnesses the private
information of various stakeholders by delegating authority to them
to select migrants subject to various constraints.
Whether the American system is in fact superior to a more centralized immigration system is an empirical question, which we have
not tried to answer as it would take us far afield. But it is worth observing that the United States has enjoyed extraordinary success in replenishing its population with waves of migrants who have integrated
into society quite successfully. This experience can be compared favorably to that of Europe, where some countries have found themselves with large groups of unassimilated migrants and their children,
whose failure to assimilate has become an explosive political issue. We
cannot prove that these different outcomes show that the US system is
superior, but they are highly suggestive.

219 8 USC § 1231(a)(4)(A) ("In general ... the Attorney General may not remove an alien who is sentenced to imprisonment until the alien is released from imprisonment.").
220 Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons:Rethinking an Anachronistic Policy *53-56 (Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper No 266, Mar 14, 2012),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1805931 (visited Nov 25, 2012).

